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But Walker Lake's death throes have not gone unnoticed. For over a century,
fierce political and court battles have been waged over the lake.
2" After years of
fighting, a Nevada court issued a decree that allocated water for hundreds of private
water users.2" Nevada, like most western states, adheres to a prior appropriation
system: individuals can hold a private interest in water.
2 This system was bome out
of the necessity of the western expansion, when water literally meant the difference
between life and death.23
The Walker Lake decree set aside plenty of water for these private users-but it
wrote out the biggest interest holders of all: the public.
24
See, we citizens have an interest in Walker Lake too, just as we have an interest
in other natural waterbodies. That interest has been recognized since ancient Roman
law-and consistently since.
25 French law recognized it in the eleventh century,
26
and Spanish law in the thirteenth.
27 Early English law recognized it, and the U.S. law
recognizes it today.28 Even Nevada's own Supreme Court has long confirmed this
public interest.29 As does its Constitution.
3° As does its statutes.31 But as far as the
Walker Lake decree was concerned, the public interest might as well not have
existed. The decree settled private and municipal rights to use the lake, but it said
nothing about the public's interest in protecting the lake itself.
32
Our public interest stems from our original sovereign contract with the
government: we gave states our rights and interests in water, to hold in trust.
3 3 So
long as that fundamental public interest in water remains unharmed, the
government's trust duties remain satisfied. This principle has come to be known as
the public trust doctrine.34 It says that the government holds the public's important
water resources in trust for them-and, like any trustee, 
cannot abdicate its duties.
35
20 See Mineral Cty. v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 900 F.3d 1027, 1028-30 (9th Cir. 2018).
21 Id. at 1029.
22 Id. at 1029, 1029 n.2.
23 See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 129 (7th ed. 2009).
24 The defending parties argue that the public interest is actually considered because Nevada law
requires water to be put to a "beneficial use," but beneficial use is a different sort of interest 
than the
public trust protects. See Mineral Cty., 900 F.3d at 1034, n.7; see also Russell M. McGlothlin & 
Scott S.
Slater, No Fictions Required. Assessing the Public Trust Doctrine in Pursuit of 
Balanced Water
Management, 17 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 53, 74-77 (2013) (comparing public trust duties and beneficial
use principles). Not to mention that, as we will see, merely considering a public interest "factor" 
is not
enough. See infra Parts IV-V.
25 See infra Section III.A.
26 Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429 n.22 (1989).27 Id. at429 n.21.
2 Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the 
Guardian
of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 57, 64-75 (2005).
29 See Mineral Cty., 900 F.3d at 1031 (citing Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606 (2011)).
30 id.
31 id.
32 See id. at 1029-30.
33 See infra Sections Ill.A, IV.B.
14 See Mineral Cty., 900 F.3d at 1030, n.3.
3
5 See infra Part I.
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The tiny county harboring Walker Lake, Mineral County, seized on this doctrine
and moved to intervene in a Nevada case to modify the Walker Lake decree.3 6
Mineral County argued that the State of Nevada must protect the public's basic
interest in keeping Walker Lake alive.37 By not doing so, the state was violating its
trust obligations. The case meandered its way up to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.38
The court recognized that the public does indeed have an interest in the lake and
that the public trust doctrine protects it, but the panel was unable to decide whether
Nevada law allowed that public interest to trump the rights of the hundreds of private
water users who had been given water permits under the decree (and if so, whether
Nevada would have to pay for taking this "property").39 That question is now
certified to the Nevada Supreme Court.4°
The Mineral County v. Walker River Irrigation Districfl case tees up questions
that have remained only partially answered across the nation: what role does the
public trust theory play in state water management? Can Nevada effectively abdicate
its public trust duties over Walker Lake by deciding that the existing private water
permits trump the need to save the lake and its ecology? And who decides: the
judiciary, or instead, the legislature and agency water managers? Perhaps most
importantly, if the state declines to recognize its public trust duties, what can the
federal courts do about it, if anything?
It turns out that courts largely view the public trust doctrine as limited by state
legislative and executive policy.4 According to this widespread theory, states may
be required to hold in trust a handful of historically big waterbodies (referred to as"navigable" waters) for certain uses like commerce, but beyond that, states are free
to dispose of water without substantial impairment of the public's interests.43 So
there is no requirement that states consider, for example, the public's interest in
conserving Walker Lake, a lake much older than the state of Nevada. And not only
can the public not meaningfully challenge a state's legislative or executive decisions
in state courts-they can't challenge the state's abdication of the public trust in
federal court either, because the scope of the trust is supposedly a state law matter.'
Courts and litigants have struggled to craft a theory that will allow the state's
trust duties to extend to more water and more uses and, perhaps most importantly,
be enforceable in both state and federal courts. I suggest such a theory here.
36 See Mineral Cty., 900 F.3d at 1030.
371id
38 id.
39
1d. at 1030-34.
40 Id. at 1034-35.
41 See generally id.42 
See, e.g., Stephen H. Leonhardt & Jessica J. Spuhler, The Public Trust Doctrine: What it is, Where
it Came From, and Why Colorado Does Not (and Should Not) Have One, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
47, 80-81, 94 (2012) (discussing legislative action and "limitations I] imposed by legislation,
administrative action, constitutional amendment, or judicial decision").
41 See id at 50-52, 70-71 (criticizing the few states, like California, who have seriously expanded
public trust protections because this expansion is out of step with historical notions about the public trust).
" See id. at 49-50 (citing PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012)).
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In short, this article explains why we should view the public trust doctrine as
reflecting very basic principles of limited state authority over water. This limitation
prevents states from seriously infringing on the public's interest in all flowing water.
In other words: when states (and occasionally the federal government) abdicate their
public trust duties, they are permitting an infringement on the public's fundamental
right to water-a violation of due process and a violation of the states' sovereign
authority.
This article proceeds in several steps,
45 but each is meant to float one realization
to the surface: There is a link between the dynamic threats to the public's interest in
water and the state's obligation to take waters into trust and protect them. A state's
sovereign authority to dispose of water within its borders depends on the threats those
waters face. And indeed, as we will see, this link is evident in the evolution of the
public trust doctrine in the United States and long before. In the past, the threats to
water were narrow, and so the public trust doctrine imposed duties on a narrow set
of those historically big, navigable waterways. But as threats to water have grown,
so have the states' obligation to take waters into trust.
This theoretical framework allows federal courts to review a state's decision to
forego its trust duties, even when it needs to go beyond those historical, navigable
waters. After all, viewed this way, enforcing the public trust is a remedy to protect
the public's interest in natural waters generally. Not only should litigants be able to
argue for an expansion of trust duties in state courts under state constitutions, they
should also be able to argue for this expansion in federal courts under the U.S.
Constitution.
Interpreting which waters and uses are protected by the trust is, in effect,
interpreting the extent of sovereign authority over water. That is a job uniquely for
the judiciary. The court doors should thus be flung wide open in even the most
restrictive of states, allowing citizens to challenge legislative and administrative
decisions about water allocation. Courts will be empowered to expand the public
trust even in the face of legislative and administrative obstinance.
This article proceeds in five steps. First, we will take a public trust bootcamp so
that you can understand the basic outlines of the doctrine. Second, we look at why a
new view of the doctrine is needed on the ground. This includes a review of the
pressing water crises that our nation faces, especially with climate change draining
the little water we have. This part also lays out the gaps in current water management
schemes and, most importantly, the gaps in the public trust that stymie the doctrine
from doing more to help.
Third, we will examine the public trust doctrine's source and nature. This is
important because the doctrine's origins and contours will implicate what guiding
principles we should use when interpreting it today. This part makes several
conclusions, including that (1) the doctrine derives from an ancient social contract
" The public trust doctrine is nuanced and complex, spawning a plethora of law review articles. E.g.,
James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 3 (2007) (noting that the doctrine has been the subject of a "raging flood 
of
academic commentary"); Ivan M. Stoner, Leading a Judge to Water: In Search of a More Fully Formed
Washington Public Trust Doctrine, 85 WASH. L. REv. 391, 391, 423 (2010) (noting "the froth that the
public doctrine has generated among academics").
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wherein the public entrusted all natural water resources to the government, (2) the
doctrine is about protecting these public resources from state waste or abdication of
its trust duties, and (3) the doctrine, as a limitation on state authority, is best viewed
as constitutional in nature-specifically, at home in the Due Process Clause. 46 This
clause makes the most sense for several reasons, including because the trust doctrine
is about protecting concrete rights in water from government harm.
Finally, the payoff: this article concludes that courts should be empowered to
interpret both the reach and force of the public trust doctrine. When states privatize
waters and cause the public interest to be harmed, the states have exceeded their
constitutional and sovereign authority. Interpreting the bounds of that authority is at
the heart of judicial function. That means that courts must be empowered to extend
the reach of the public trust to new waters and new uses to adequately redress those
public harms.
The article finishes by cataloguing the many advantages of this approach. Not
only will the gaps in state adoption of the public trust be filled based on local and
adaptive needs, but legislative failure will be shored up.
I. A PUBLIC TRUST BOOTCAMP
As many scholars have discussed at length, the public trust doctrine's roots are
deep, extending through early America, English common law, thirteenth century
Spain, eleventh century France, and all the way back to early Roman law.47 The basic
idea is that water is so essential to all mankind48 that everyone should be allowed to
freely enjoy it, like the air we breathe.49 Indeed, because water is so important, it's
better viewed as a fundamental right of the people rather than a fungible good owned
46 Others have suggested a constitutional home for the public trust doctrine-as well as urged states
to incorporate broader public trust protections for waters. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen,
The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1450-51; Carol Necole Brown, Drinking from a
Deep Well: The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1,2-13, 17 (2006).
This article attempts to build on this work.47 See, e.g., Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding Property Rights
and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 348-52, 365-66 (2006); Wilkinson, supra note 26, at
428-31 (tracing the roots of the public trust doctrine to thirteenth century Spain, eleventh century France,
the Qin dynasty 200 years before Christ, and beyond); see also MAGNA CARTA ch. 33 (1215); J. INST.
2.1.1; SIR MATrHEW HALE, A TREATISE RELATIVE TO THE MARITIME LAW OF ENGLAND, IN THREE
PARTS 8-9, 11 (1787); Noah D. Hall & Joseph Regalia, Interstate Groundwater Law
Revisited- Mississippi v. Tennessee, 34 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 152, 166-86 (2016).48 j. INST. 2.1.1.
49 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1252-56 (D. Or. 2016) (discussing the trust
theory of the doctrine).
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by governments.5° Water, in other words, is a property of the "commons" that no
single landowner or sovereign can take for their own.
5
That's where the trust part comes in. The theory is that sovereigns do not own
water; instead, they are its trustees-protecting this precious resource for water's
true beneficiaries: the state's citizens.
52 It's rather similar to any other fundamental
right that governments protect on behalf of the public (more on that later).
53 Even the
U.S. Supreme Court has supported the force of this limitation on the government's
relationship with water, explaining that "[t]he control of the State for the purposes
of the trust can never be lost," except when "promoting the interests of the public"
or when privatizing the water will not inflict "any substantial impairment of the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining."
54
The public trust has come to be seen as both a limiting and empowering legal
principle.55 The trust imposes obligations on the sovereign, but at the same time, it
also empowers sovereigns to take steps to protect water resources, even if doing so
will conflict with some other interests (like private water rights).
56
The public trust doctrine has nearly always been concerned with state duties and
powers over water.57 Practically, there are two aspects of the doctrine that are worth
covering at the outset: First, which state waters are covered by the trust, and second,
what water uses must states protect?
" See id; see also 11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) ("[O]wnership of the
navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under them is a subject of public concern to the whole
people of the State. The trust with which they are held, therefore, is governmental and cannot be alienated
.... "); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 721,727 (Cal. 1983); Joseph
L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MiCH. 
L.
REv. 471,478-85 (1970).
"' See HALE, supra note 47 at 8-9; see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,445-56
(Haw. 2000) (applying public trust obligations to a state agency).
52 Sax, supra note 50, at 483, 485-86; see A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND
RESOURCES § 8:4 (2005) ("Public ownership of submerged beds is the source of the public right to use
the overlying waters.").
53 See infra Part IV; see also Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250 (addressing substantive due process
rights to water as impacted by climate change).
4 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453 (applying limitations on state power).
" See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979) ("[I]t is the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the
trust and secure its beneficial use in the future to the people of the State."); In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d at 453 ("Under the public trust, the state has both the authority and duty to preserve
the rights of present and future generations in the waters of the state.").
56 See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1344 (Haw. 1973).
57 There is some debate about whether the public trust stems from federal or state law, and we will
take a look at that question later. And the federal courts have variously recognized some federal trust
issues. But the public trust has practically been applied mostly to the states, and the U.S. Supreme Court
has described the doctrine as a matter of state law. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576,
603-04 (2012). So we will stick to the application to states for now.
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Early U.S. cases, like English decisions that came before, extended the public
trust to a relatively narrow set of "navigable,"58 major waterways within each state.5 9
Think the Mississippi and major ocean-touching ports.60 Cases often connected a
state's public trust duties with language about ownership.6' Courts reasoned that
states took ownership of the beds of certain major waterways when they joined the
union--and this ownership came with an attendant trust duty over the surface
waters.
62
But as I explored in a prior article, the idea that states "owned" the water itself
quickly proved to be a legal fiction.63 Instead, as will be explained below, courts
were wrangling with two separate questions: (1) What lands do states own?
and (2) Which waters should states be protecting?'4 Suffice it to say for now that
these navigable waterways triggered the sovereign's public trust duties;
non-navigable waters, according to these early courts, did not-water in those bodies
could be owned or used up.6" Likewise, early decisions required states to protect only
a few public uses of water: navigation, commerce, and fishing.6"
As we will see later in this article, the contours of the public trust doctrine have
evolved a lot on both of these points, especially in recent decades.67 In terms of which
waters are covered, for example, many states have expanded the scope of which
waters trigger trust obligations to include smaller waterbodies or even all the water
within their borders-labeling these waters as "navigable" for purposes of the public
trust doctrine.
68
The evolution of the doctrine is complicated, in part, because U.S. water law
fractured into two loose systems in the 1800s: existing riparian water law on the east
58 The definition of"navigable waters" varies depending on the legal context in water law. "Navigable
waters" reach different waters for: (1) state title purposes; (2) the federal Commerce Clause power;(3) federal jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water Act; (4) federal jurisdiction under the Rivers andHarbors Act; and (5) admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND
OCEAN LAW 4, 16-21, 117-18, 134-38 (3d ed. 2007).
59 See Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical
Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don 't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
511,567-75 (1975).60 See id. at 569-75; Indeed, in England, navigable waterways for purposes of the trust included onlywater affected by the tide. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical
Analysis, I SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 48, 68 (1976).
61 See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,26-28 (1894)); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 1, 14 (1935); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S.
367, 381, 410, 416-17 (1842).62 See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10; United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14.
63 Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 166-67, 181 n.223, 183.
64 See infra Section V.
61 See infra Section V. The evolution of navigability for purposes of public trust is discussed more below.
66 See DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., COASTAL STATES ORG., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO
WORK 6, 12 (2d ed. 1997); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (emphasizing the public
rights of fishing and navigation).
67 See infra Section IV.
66 Michael Blumm offers an excellent explanation of the state-title public trust and the sovereign
public trust, pointing out that both exist. See Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel, Proprietary and
Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian and Hale to Lamprey and Oswego Lake, 43 VT. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (2018).
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half of the nation and prior appropriation on the west.
69 Riparian law ties water rights
to landownership and recognizes an egalitarian relationship between users: water is
essentially "common property.
70
The prior appropriation system is a first-in-time private resource management
scheme, borne out of the western expansion and based on mining law.
71 Private
parties can perfect a right to use a certain amount 
of water for beneficial uses.
72
"The basic rules of prior appropriation effectively lock in established water uses and
allow them to continue without change .... [W]ater rights last forever, and their
terms are rarely amended to reflect changed conditions.
'73 Most western states have
created a permitting scheme to govern this process of perfecting private water
rights.74 That is, with the exception of Colorado.
75 Water is thus generally allocated
in these states by legislative creation of schemes and executive execution of detailed
permitting processes.
76
The prior appropriation doctrine complicates the scope of which waters are
within the scope of the states' trust obligations. Back in the late 1800s, Congress
subjected non-navigable waters to prior appropriation and gave western states
control over those waters-in other words, it handed over all non-navigable waters
to the states themselves.
77 The general result of all this is that states (and the U.S.
Supreme Court) have recognized that western states may generally determine which
waters should be included in their trust-so long as states take trust ownership over
historically navigable waterways.
78 And the same goes for which public interests
should be protected under the trust.
79
A sore spot for the public trust should also be mentioned at the outset: the prior
appropriation doctrine relies heavily on private rights to water, and these private
rights can conflict with a state's efforts to carry out its public trust obligations over
water.80 No one seriously disputes that private parties can secure a protectable right
69 TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 23, at 43-133; see also William L. Andreen, The Evolving Contours
of Water Law in the United States: Bridging the Gap Between Water Rights, Land Use 
and the Protection
of the Aquatic Environment, 23 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 5, 8-11 (2006).
70See Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,351,356 (1908); Andreen, supra note 69, at 8.
71 See TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 23, at 121 33; see also Andreen, supra note 69, at 10.
72 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 711, 714 n.8 (Cal. 1983).
73 Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in Common: Considering the Similarities Between
Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29, 51 (2004).
74 TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 23, at 194-95.
71 Id. at 194.
76 See id.
77See 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2018).
78 See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603-04 (2012) (Justice Kennedy explaining
that "the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law" and "[u]nder accepted 
principles of
federalism, the States retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over 
waters within
their borders, while federal law determines riverbed title under the equal-footing doctrine"); 
see also
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 n.5 (1976); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 
589,612 (1945);
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1937) (confirming the import of the Desert Land Act).
79 See PPL Montana, LLC, 565 U.S. at 587-88, for an example of public interests affected by
unauthorized use of riverbeds.
0 See, e.g., id.; Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 711 (Cal. 
1983);
Bos. Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 357 (Mass. 1979).
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to use water.81 But, for example, it's quite common for a private use of
water-combining forces with other private uses or environmental factors-to
threaten important waterbodies subject to a state's trust obligations.82 When private
rights to water interfere with waters subject to the public trust, states are in theory
required to step in and protect the trust waters.83
But these conflicts have spawned contentious debate and diverging caselaw.84
Some courts view a state carrying out its trust obligations as a constitutional taking
when private rights are seriously harmed-a simple matter of a common law rule
(the public trust doctrine) butting up against citizens' constitutional property rights
(their prior appropriation water rights).85
But other courts view the state's trust obligation as a fundamental limitation
baked directly into private rights.86 This view recognizes that the public has a
preexisting interest and right to water resources, and that when those rights are
threatened so much that they touch on waters subject to the public trust, private water
rights are qualified.87 This view is much like the principle that rights that come with
owning land are qualified by the competing rights of others, like the right to be free
from nuisances.88
Another important feature of the public trust is that both members of the public
and the states themselves can sue under the doctrine.89 States can sue to protect trust
resources under their parens patriate powers.90  Members of the public
(who otherwise have standing) may sue the state for failing to comply with its trust
obligations over a particular body of water.91
There is much more that can be said about the public trust doctrine, but that
should do for now.92 With the basics covered, let's dive deeper into what the doctrine
looks like today and where some of its shortcomings lie.
81 See PPL Montana, LLC, 565 U.S. at 580 (offering support for the private right to use water under
certain circumstances).
82 See, e.g., Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 711.
83 Id. at 732.
84 
See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 35.09 (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2019).85 Id. (describing this conflict and providing examples of cases in several footnotes).86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See Robin Kundis Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity Defenses to Takings Liability for Sea
Level Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 401-03 (2011).
89 Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (111. 1970) (utilizing the public trust doctrine as
grounds for standing); Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States' ExclusiveEconomic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public
Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18-19 (2009) (describing the public trust doctrine as presumptive
grounds for standing).
90 See Turnipseed et al., supra note 89, at 18-19, 19 n.106.
91 See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).92 For example, the federal government has various conflicting and superior interests in water thatcan complicate trust principles. See Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 156-58, 163-65 (1900); Gibson
v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-76 (1897).
2019-2020
Vol. 108KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
II. SOME STATES HAVE EMBRACED THEIR TRUST OBLIGATIONS TO MEET
EVOLVING THREATS TO WATER RESOURCES; SOME HAVE SHED
THEIR DUTIES COMPLETELY
A. We are in a water crisis and adaptive, aggressive action is needed to protect
precious water resources, especially in the west.
There is little dispute about the pressing need for governments to protect their
winnowing water resources.
93 The western U.S. is facing the worst water crisis in
more than a century.94 And climate change is altering water resources across the
nation.
95
In Nevada, for example, a long-term drought has gripped much of the Colorado
River Basin.96 The amount of water flowing into Southern Nevada's major water
storage, Lake Mead, has declined rapidly.
97 Climate change is predicted to put
increasing pressure on Nevada's water resources.
98 Rainfall is expected to decrease,
evaporation will increase, and water resource availability will decrease.
99 The same
crisis is faced by many other states.'
° And that includes not just the arid west, but
the east, too. 1'
Couple these climate threats to water with an increase in water usage and greater
demands for water in urban areas and you have a water management dumpster fire.
We are already seeing water supplies dwindle in some areas of the U.S., as well as
degraded water quality nationwide.1
0 2 Government agencies have identified areas
that will face critical water supply threats, regardless of climate change.
0 3
93 See generally UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE COMPENDIUM
(Catherine P. McMullen & Jason Jabbour eds., 2009), http://wedomunep.org/bitmn/handlei20.500.1182217798/-
Cfmate%20Change 20Science%2O om %202009-2009881.pdfsequence=3&isAllowed-y
[https-J/penna.ccEG79-AVCE].
"' One potent example is California. See Amir AghaKouchak et al., Water and Climate: 
Recognize
Anthropogenic Drought, 524 NATURE 409, 409 (2015).
95 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT,
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 8, 11 (Nov. 2007),
https.//www.ipcc.ch/sitelasse/loads/2018/02/ar
4 syrfullreportpdf [https'//pemaccS5EC-KB7W]; U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT'S IN THE UNrIED 
STATES: A STATE
OF KNOWLEDGE REPORT 41 (2009), hups:/downloads.globalchange.govhsimpact/sId
fs/ch
m ate- hnpa
c ts -
reportpdf [httpsJ/pemn.cc/D5TY-9LFMI ("Evidence Is mounting that human-induced climate change 
is already
altering many of the existing patterns of precipitation in the United States, including when, 
where, how much, and
what kind of precipitation falls.").
96 See U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-F-16-030, WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE MEANS FOR NEVADA
(Aug. 2016), httpsJ/19jauary217sapshotepa-gov/sites/p
r du ction/fi le s/2
0 16 -O 9/d0c
u men /ldc lim ate-c
h an ge -
nv.pdf[https://perma-cd/F4W2-J3SA].
9' See id.
98
1d.
99 Id.
" See. e.g., Feared Trout Drop-off Signals Climate Shift in Montana, PBS NEWSHOUR 
(Oct. 31,
2008, 6:40 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/feared-trout-drop-ff-signals-climate-shift-in-
montana [https://perma.cc/X2ST-G2WK].
101 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 95, at 41-42.
102 Id. at 41.
103 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'TOF INTERIOR: BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WATER 2025: 
PREVENTING CRISES
AND CONFLICT IN THE WEST 9 (2005).
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I won't belabor the threats to water resources because so many other scholars
have done so, and better than I can." You might think that given these threats,
federal and state governments would be passing water management policy at every
legislative session, anything to avert the coming disaster. But no. There remain
glaring shortcomings in water management policy across the country, including stark
gaps in state adoption of public trust duties to protect water resources.
B. Many states have shed or cut their public trust duties.
Following federal directives that states should decide the reach of their public
trust obligations (at least beyond the historical minimum), a patchwork of approaches
have developed.°5 This is not necessarily a bad thing: one of the advantages of the
public trust framework is that it is adaptive to local needs.'0 6
But one major problem stems from states that have narrowly confined or
abdicated their public trust duties altogether. This make some sense, given that the
prior appropriation doctrine, at its heart, favors private water users.'0 7 Using up
water-indeed, using every drop of it up-is the goal in a pure prior appropriation
world: "[W]ater users perceived pumping a stream dry not merely as an allowed
outcome, but as a desired one."'0 8
States have cabined the reach of their public trust duties in terms of(1) the waters
covered, (2) the uses protected, and (3) the power of the trust obligations themselves.
Other scholars have done admirable jobs of sorting the precise contours of each
state's public trust doctrine, so I won't repeat all that here.'0 9
In short, many states have narrowed the waters, uses, and impact of the public
trust doctrine to the basic scope described in a U.S. Supreme Court case from the
1800s, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois. "' Major waterways and the trinity of
uses are protected, but not much more.' Some states have expanded the scope of
waters to include waterbodies capable of floating logs, or supporting certain sorts of
recreation, or to artificial and major waterways.' 1 2 But most states have maintained
a relatively narrow scope similar to the Illinois Central standard from the late 1800s,
"o See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 56-57 (2010); Patrick C. McGinley, Climate Change and the Public Trust Doctrine,
65 PLAN. & ENvTL. L. 7, 7 (2013).
105 Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law
Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 814 (2010).
06Id. at 785.
07 Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Environmental Flows in the Rocky Mountain West: A Progress Report,
9 Wyo. L. REV. 335, 335-36 (2009).
108 Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative State, 45
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1099, 1111 (2012).
109 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 103, at 93-197.
"o Id. at 69-70, 93-197; see generally Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
.. See Craig, supra note 104, at 69-70, 93-197.112 See id. at 93-197; see also Craig, supra note 105, at 818-19; Joseph J. Kalo, "It's Navigable in
Fact So I Can Fish in It": The Public Right to Use Man-Made, Navigable-in-Fact Waters of Coastal
North Carolina, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2095, 2112-13 (2011) (noting that North Carolina courts have
established that public trust principles extend to artificial waters).
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with modest expansions.113 For example, Alaskan caselaw largely mirrors Illinois
Central's minimums,"4 despite the fact that Alaska enacted far-reaching statutory
language suggesting that the public has broad rights in all sorts of water bodies."
5
Arizona,"6 Idaho,"7 and Kansas similarly limit their trust duties, to name a few
states."l
8
Then you have Colorado, which has narrowed the scope of the doctrine to
nothingness. The Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado
non-navigable: "the natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable within its
territorial limits, and practically all of them have their sources within its own
boundaries, and [] no stream of any importance whose source is without those
boundaries, flows into or through this state.""' This, again, is despite legislation and
constitutional language suggesting that water is at least partially public property.
20
Colorado is instructive about the potential costs of big gaps in public trust
protections for water resources. Like many and western states, Colorado is slated to
see rising temperatures, less rainfall, and increasing 
threats to its water resources.
121
Failures to incorporate a robust public interest in water management may have
resulted in needed preventative measures racking up, now totaling a projected $20
billion in needed investment to address state water requirements.
122 Colorado's
"Fraser River got down to 4 cfs in 2002 ..... [t]he Crystal River got down to 1 cfs
in 2012[,] [t]he Roaring Fork River got down to 5 cfs in 2012[,] [and] [t]he Dolores
River regularly dries up.'' 123 The Colorado River stopped regularly reaching its end
113 Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications
of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2007) 
("Alabama
has a poorly developed public trust doctrine that has never been expanded beyond the basic federal
doctrine. Similarly, while recognizing log floatation, Missouri has not otherwise expanded its 
public trust
doctrine beyond the federal test. Finally, although West Virginia has barely developed its 
public trust
doctrine, it is clearly and strongly based on the federal public trust doctrine. In addition, West 
Virginia
views the public trust properties as public lands and manages them as such .. "); Craig, supra note 104,
at 76 ("Among the western states, Colorado and Idaho have most clearly adhered to the strict 
and limited
traditional view of public rights in their public trust doctrines. Relying on the federal test of navigability,
the Colorado Supreme Court has declared almost all streams in Colorado to be non-navigable ....
114 See City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dep't of Nat. Res., 137 P.3d 261, 263 n.8 (Alaska 2006).
115 ALASKA STAT. § 38.04.910(5) (2019).
116 Defs. of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 729-31 (Ariz Ct App. 2001) (applying the federal navigability test).
117 Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983).
"' State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1363-65 (Kan. 1990); see also Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544,553-57 (1981) (Montana); State Eng'r v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev. 1970).
119 Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds by Denver Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975); see also United States 
v. Dist.
Court ex rel. Eagle Cty., 458 P.2d 760,762 (Colo. 1969); Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 37 N.W.2d 488,
491 (N.D. 1949) (showing a similar determination of the navigability of a lake in North Dakota); 
State ex
rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Warden, 198 P.2d 402, 406-07 (Okla. 1948) (evaluating 
the
characterization of a river under Oklahoma law).
120 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (2018).
121 JEFF LUKAS ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IN COLORADO: A SYNTHESIS TO SUPPORT 
WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND ADAPTATION 1 (2d ed. 2014).
1
22 COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO'S WATER PLAN 1-1 (2015).
123 Brent Gardner-Smith, Colorado 's Instream Flow Program is Lauded, Challenged, ASPEN
JOURNALISM (Jan. 21, 2014), http://aspenjoumalism.org/2014/01/21/state-of-colorados-instream-flow-
program-is-lauded-challenged/ [https://perma.cc/47CC-9B4X] (quoting attorney Ken 
Ransford, a
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in the Gulf of California for over fifty years because of over-appropriation-until
2014 when the federal government stepped in.124
The high-water mark for incorporation of the public trust in prior appropriation
systems in the West is California1 25 and Hawaii.126 For example, in California,
"[t]he state's right to protect fish is not limited to navigable or otherwise public
waters but extends to any waters where fish are habitated or accustomed to resort
and through which they have the freedom of passage to and from the public fishing
grounds of the state."1 7 Hawaii's trust is as expansive.128
But even in those states, the public trust is limited-not by the effect on public
interest in water, but by historic and legislative definitions of what waters the trust
attaches to.129 So trust duties do not extend to some non-navigable waters or
groundwater.30 Both of these states, like others, interpret the contours of the public
trust in the shadow of legislative intent. As one Hawaiian court explained, the trust
applies expansively only when the legislature has allowed it to:
The public trust in the water resources of this state, like the navigable
waters trust, has its genesis in the common law. ... The [State Water]
Code does not evince any legislative intent to abolish the common law
public trust doctrine. To the contrary, . . . the legislature appears to have
engrafted the doctrine wholesale in the Code.13
Scholars seem to agree that to change the status quo, the legislature or executive
must step in and voluntarily agree to a new, more robust standard for water
management. 
32
In the end, you may start to question how much the public trust really matters.
States that politically want to protect water resources have recognized a robust public
trust doctrine; states that prefer to protect private rights have limited the doctrine.33
Presumably, these states could have legislated to achieve the same ends. Robin Craig,
in her authoritative guide to the public trust doctrine, explains this point:
member of the Colorado River Basin Roundtable) ("These are some of our biggest rivers in the state and
they all but dry up.").124 Sarah Zielinski, The Colorado River Delta Turned Green After a Historic Water Pulse,
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/colorado-river-
delta-tumed-green-after-historic-water-pulse- I 80953670/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/43PR-PW8X].
125 See, e.g., State v. Super. Ct. of Placer Cty., 625 P.2d 256, 257-58 (Cal. 1981).
126 See Craig, supra note 104, at 118, 122-24.
127 Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct App. 1989).
128 See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982).
129 See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (noting
the historical basis of the navigability doctrine).
130 Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003); Golden Feather, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42.
131 In re Water, 9 P.3d at 442 (citations omitted).
132 See, e.g., Larry Myers, To Have Our Water and Use It Too: Why Colorado Water Law Needs a
Public Interest Standard, 87 U. COLO. L. REv. 1041, 1059 (2016) (opining that to incorporate public trust
principles "would require, at a minimum, amending the Colorado Constitution").
1"3 Craig, supra note 104, at 71-72.
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In states where these larger public policies include recognition of actual
or potential loss of the public values of fresh water, more robust public
trust doctrines are often the result. In contrast, in states where public
policies favor private rights, more restricted public trust doctrines have
been the norm.
13 4
Arizona, for example, limits the public trust by statute to reach the very minimum
defined under federal law.'
3 5 Contrast Arizona with Hawaii, which as a public policy
matter advocates for much stronger resource protections-and thus adopts 
a
farther-reaching public trust doctrine.'
36 So, unsurprisingly: Arizona's courts have
interpreted the public trust narrowly, while the trust has been interpreted much
broader in California and Hawaii.'
3 7
Even in states that recognize some broader reach to the public trust, the impact
of the trust is varied. That's because states disagree about how much weight to afford
the public interest element. Some states view the public trust as an option for state
legislatures and administrators: if they want to consider it, they can.'
38 Some states
do a bit better in requiring water administrators to at least consider the public trust
as one factor in the water allocation analysis. '
3 9 Then some states accord extra weight
to the public interest, recognizing that infringing public rights is of paramount
importance.
140
There are other gaps in the states' adoption of public trust principles. One 
is
deferential standards of review.'
4 ' Take California, one of the more progressive
states in protecting public interests in water. Courts there have held that both
legislative and adjudicative actions over water deserve deference.
4 As of 2012, no
other state "has set aside an agency decision on public trust grounds, or has ordered
the reexamination of an existing (or applied-for) water right.'
'143 "Rather, California
courts show a prevailing trend of deference to 
[agencies] on public trust issues."'
44
Ultimately, a couple of states have heavily narrowed or outright abdicated their
public trust duties, including Arizona and Colorado.
145 In these states, legislatures
and water agencies are largely unbound by any fundamental sovereign or other
134 Id.
131 See Defs. of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); San Carlos Apache Tribe v.
Super. Ct. ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999); see also Calmat 
of Ariz. v. State ex
rel. Miller, 836 P.2d 1010, 1020-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Ariz. Ctr. for Law 
in the Pub. Interest v.
Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162-73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
136 See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287,310 (Haw. 1982).
117 See Craig, supra note 103, at 101, 108-09, 122.
"' See Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and 
Transfer in the
West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681,689-90 (1987) (discussing 
varying approaches
to what weight public interest plays in state water management systems).
139 See id.
'40 See id. at 689.
' Ronald B. Robie, Effective Implementation of the Public Trust Doctrine in California 
Water
Resources Decision-Making: A View from the Bench, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1155, 1167-69 
(2012).
142 Id. at 1167-68.
143 Owen, supra note 108, at 1122-23.
'4 Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 42, at 77.
145 See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 37-1130 (2019); Craig, supra note 104, at 101-02, 117-18.
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public trust obligation.46 And even in states with more robust versions of the
doctrine, the view that the public trust doctrine stems from legislative prerogative or
other historic or static precepts bogs the doctrine down in the courts.147
Problems like these likely derive from states' belief that the legislature and
executive branches have final say in interpreting the contours of the public trust.
They also stem from state courts feeling hamstrung by their legislatures and
executive branches, and no easy avenue open for federal review. We will return to
these topics soon.
C. These gaps in the state public trust compound the shortcomings
in water management policy generally.
The water resource crisis is pressing. Scholars and researchers generally agree
that to meet these crises, the legal response must be aggressive and adaptive to local
needs. 1
48
At the outset, some suggest that public trust principles are already protected in
many states via statute or administrative process. To be sure, many states have
enacted statutes, water permitting schemes, and constitutional provisions that say
they favor public-trust-like principles. 49 But as explained in the prior section, these
directives have often remained disconnected from states' views about which waters
and which uses are shielded by the public trust doctrine.5 ° In other words: states
trumpet public interests in water, but they don't necessarily extend public trust duties
as far as their proclamations would suggest.'5'
There is also a big difference between the binding obligations of trust duties and
the open-ended mandates of positive law protections for the public interest. In other
words, we simply look at water subject to trust differently than we do water which
is not:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the
self-interest of private parties.152
Most courts view state proclamations of public interest in water akin to general
welfare language: a basis to challenge the state, if at all, only in the most extreme
'4 See Craig, supra note 104, at 101-02, 117-18.
147 See, e.g., Santa Teresa Citizen Action Grp. v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868,884 (Cal. Ct App. 2003).148 See Craig, supra note 105, at 796-97.
149 See CAL CONST. art. X, § 4 (codifying public tist doctrine); HAW. CONST. art. Xl, §§ 1, 7; MONT. CONST.
art. IX § 3; PA. CONST. art I, § 27; WASH. CONST. art. XVIL § 1; WIS. CONST. art IX, § 1; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 6307 (West 2005); Mic COMp. LAWS SERv. § 324.32501 et seq. (LexisNexis 2012); see also Hall & Regalia,
supra note 47, at 166-86 (discussing various state proclamations of public water rights).
:50 See Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, 166-86.
'51 See id.
152 Sax, supra note 50, at 490.
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cases where a state has ignored basic limitations on its police powers.'
53 For example,
in Arizona, at least one statute requires water applications to be rejected if they are
"against the interests and welfare of the public."'54 But to date, there are no recorded
cases suggesting that the public's interest has been used to challenge a water
application. Colorado offers a more stark example.'
55
And some states have gone so far as to expressly disavow that these public
interest proclamations have any force, writing in specific standards for their water
management hat ignore public trust principles altogether.'
5 6 Montana's standards
for granting private water permits merely require consideration of the available water
and whether other private users will be impacted.'
57 Water agencies have also often
been criticized as captured by private interests.'
58
Perhaps most obviously, we cannot rely on legislative and executive action alone,
as those standards can be changed because of short-term political motivations,
ignoring the long-term nature of the rights protected by the public trust.'
59 Carol Rose
has deftly explained the problems with legislative responses to water resource
problems: legislatures are vulnerable to the well-funded developers of natural
resources--especially when opposition is "large and diffuse,"'
60 say, when some
interests are held by future members of the public.'61 When certain groups gain rights
to these resources, the "endowment effect" comes into play, which says that it is
much harder to take away rights once they are given.'
62 The value of the judiciary in
the water resources space starts to make some sense.
There is also a practical side to these legislative and executive shortcomings.
Hope Babcock points out that "[t]he impacts of climate change are way beyond what
little adaptive capacity natural resources laws have.'
' 163 And "a 'fundamental
1' See Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of Water Allocation in the West, 
9
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 485, 486 nn.1-3 (2006).
'-4 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153(A) (2019).
155 See supra text accompanying note 119.156 
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153 (considering "conflicts with vested rights"); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 533.370 (LexisNexis 2019) (considering "conflicts with existing rights").
157 MONT. CODE. ANN. § 85-2-311 (2019).
'5 Western state water codes and the agencies implementing them were simply not designed 
to protect
the public trust:
From the beginning, these were captured agencies in the fullest sense: publicly-funded bodies
whose mission was to protect and promote a limited class of private rights. Despite
improvements in western water administration during the last decade or so, the interests that
created the agencies in the first place, and served as the agencies' sole constituency, had already
locked in well over a century of private uses.
Wilkinson, supra note 26, at 470.
.
59 
See Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon to a Dim Star: Why Outmoded Water Codes 
and
"Public Interest" Review Cannot Protect he Public Trust in Western Water Law, 
32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
283, 319-21 (2013).
161 Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings
Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 294 (1996).
161 See id. at 294-95.
1
62 Id. at 295.
163 Hope M. Babcock, Using the Federal Public Trust Doctrine to Fill Gaps in the Legal Systems
Protecting Migrating Wildlife from the Effects of Climate Change, 95 NEB. L. REV. 649, 
667 (2017).
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re-envisioning' of environmental and natural resources law seems unlikely because
of the rigidity of the laws themselves, constraining all but the most modest of
expansions, and the low probability that Congress will enact new laws or even amend
old ones in the current political environment.' ' "M
Robin Craig agrees, explaining that the "extent and severity of specific climate
change impacts in specific states and localities are likely to remain uncertain for
some time yet," and that adaptations will be required into the future.165 And perhaps
more important, there will often be a divergence of interests between political plans
for current future water needs and future interests in water-the holders of which
have no voice in the legislature.166
In short, positive law offers only so much help when it comes to water resources,
particularly given how much deference is paid to the states when it comes to water
management.67 Private conservation is a drop in the bucket. 68
On top of that, as explained in the prior section, states have compounded the
problem by creating large gaps in water resource management, and state legislatures
and agencies that don't want to fill them are not voluntarily adopting a robust public
trust doctrine.169 State legislatures and agencies are thus often not required to
consider wide-ranging current and future public interests in water when making
resource decisions.7 ' Mary Christina Wood summed up the problem of failing to
include any sort of background limiting principle on state governments when it
comes to resource management: "Under the system of environmental statutory
laws ... over the past three decades, agencies at every jurisdictional level have
gained nearly unlimited authority to manage natural resources and allow their
destruction by private interests through permit systems."''
Courts-state and federal-have no alternative, adaptive legal doctrine to
address these concerns.
16' Id. at 667-68 (first quoting Robin Kundis Craig, "Stationarity Is Dead"-Long Live
Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL L. REv. 9, 30
(2010); then citing Todd S. Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law to Accomplish Environmental
Objectives, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 35 (2014)).
"6' Craig, supra note 105, at 807.
16' See generally id.
167 See Jamison Colburn, Habitat Reserve Problem-Solving: Desperately Seeking Sophisticated
Intermediaries, 41 ENVTL. L. 619, 629 (2011) ("The major federal public lands systems and the statutes
governing them have been shaped to fit other priorities, and the potential connectivity between publiclands as habitat is, as a rule, very low."). The exception is the Clean Water Act, which is of limited use.
Id. at 625-26 n.38.
1
6
1 See Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 AKRON L. REV.
1091, 1113-15 (2013).
169 See supra Section 1.B.
"' Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a
Pardigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 65-84 (2009).
171 Id. at 44.
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III. THE SOURCE AND DEFINITION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST
A. The doctrine derives from the public conferring to their government their
wholesale rights and interests in water-not from a notion of
government itle or interest in commerce.
The public trust operates on the theory that citizens have entrusted some of their
rights and interests in water to the government, usually the states, for safekeeping.
72
As explained later, this trust theory is emblematic of fundamental constitutional
principles embedded in American democracy.
73 Thus, whatever the public gave the
sovereign, the sovereign still has-and presumably, because of those trust
obligations, cannot freely give away.
174 The question, then, is what exactly did the
public give into their sovereigns' hands?
Some have suggested that the public trust doctrine was intended to protect
commerce or travel.'75 Others have suggested it is best viewed as a byproduct of
states owning certain water under the equal-footing doctrine.
176 If either were so,
then limiting the public trust at its source to certain major navigable waterways or
uses may make some sense. But the underpinnings of the public trust doctrine may
be better seen as deriving from the public's transfer of its natural interests and rights
to flowing water, not some court-defined subset of rights to big waterbodies or
navigable waterways. 177 Court after court, scholar after scholar: all have cited general
public-right principles as the basis of the doctrine.'
78
172 See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 169 (1837) (Baldwin, J., concurring) (found in
Baldwin's Constitutional Views, 134-69) (explaining that "[bly the common law, it is clear, that all arms of 
the sea,
coves, creeks, etc. where the tide ebbs and flows, are the property of the sovereign," but that this title is 
held on behalf
of U.S. citizens); St. Croix Waterway Ass'n v. Meyer, 178 F.3d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 1999); Stockton v. Baltimore 
&
N.Y.R. Co., 32 F. 9, 19-20 (D.NJ. 1887) ("[A]fter the conquest, the said lands were held by the state, 
as they were
by the king, in trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, 
piers, light-
houses, beacons, and other facilities of navigation and commerce.") (emphasis added); El Dorado 
Irr. Dist v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 490-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Brannon 
v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367,
372-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2007); Bauman v. Woodlake Partners, LLC, 681 S.E.2d 819, 824 (N.C. Ct App. 
2009).
173 See infra Section III.C.
174 See generally Osherenko, supra note 47.
175 To be fair, early decisions often referred to the public trust doctrine in terms of navigation,
describing important waterways as "public highways." See, e.g., N. Transp. Co. v. City 
of Chicago, 99
U.S. 635, 643 44 (1878); Daniels v. Carney, 42 So. 452, 453 (Ala. 1906); Colberg, Inc. 
v. State ex rel.
Dep't of Pub. Works, 432 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1967); Town of Orange v. Resnick, 109 
A. 864, 867 (Conn.
1920); Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers' 
Ass'n, 48 So.
643, 644-45 (Fla. 1909) (discussing navigation); State ex rel. Wilcox v. T. 0. L., Inc., 206 So. 
2d 69, 71
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Parsons v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co., 164 N.W. 
413, 414 (Mich.
1917) (quoting Woodman v. Pitman, 10 A. 321, 327 (Me. 1887) (Haskell, J., concurring)); 
Gaither v.
Albemarle Hosp., Inc., 70 S.E.2d 680, 691 (N.C. 1952); Macrum v. Hawkins, 184 N.E. 
817, 819 (N.Y.
1933); see also Maureen E. Brady, Defining "Navigability": Balancing State-Court 
Flexibility and
Private Rights in Waterways, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415, 1431 (2015).
176 Kramerv. City of Lake Oswego, 395 P.3d. 592,604 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) (suggesting an ownership
theory of public trust).
177 See J. INST. 2.1.1 (discussing the public's right to flowing water).
"' See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1252-53 (D. Or. 2016); Nat'l 
Audubon
Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983); Lance Noel & Jeremy Firestone, 
Public
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The idea that public trust turns on state title to underlying beds has been largely
debunked.179 Ownership of the corpus of water has never been given much shrift.'80
And while courts have occasionally tethered the public trust to ownership of
underlying land-particularly in early America'81 -courts and scholars have
consistently shied away from these ownership principles over the last century.'82
Both state and federal courts have clarified that the public trust doctrine does not rely
on states owning certain land under the equal footing doctrine.'83 Indeed, the U.S.
Supreme Court disconnected public trust duties from ownership as far back as the
late 1800s.'84
As to the theory that the public trust is borne out of a concern about commerce
(which may suggest that the doctrine stems from federal law and the commerce
power, or a state version of those principles)--that theory does not bear out well
either.'85 Instead, as we will see shortly, commerce just happened to be the public
interest of the day, but that does not mean commerce is the definition of the public's
interest for all time. At bottom, the public trust doctrine arises out of a much more
fundamental public right and interest in flowing water itself.'86
Those principles begin at least with Roman law and the Code of Justinian.'87
Many scholars have quoted and analyzed the relevant language at length, but the
consensus is that this is at least one of the earliest and foundational sources of the
public trust.'88 The Code stands for the proposition that "air, running water, the sea,
Trust Doctrine Implications of Electricity Production, 5 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 169, 189 (2015)
(noting that "[s]cholarly commentary" suggests the public trust serves to "basic public interests").
1'9 Indeed, this has long been the case. See SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN
STATES 11-13 (3d ed. 1911).
0 See Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 167-68.
'8 See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410-11 (1842) (stating that states "hold the
absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them").
182 See id. at 389-95 (tracing the history of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of water as property
in the context of state vs. state and state vs. federal water disputes, and concluding that the ownership
theory has been firmly debunked); see also, e.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) (recognizing that public trust is not necessarily connected to title).
183 See, e.g., Corvallis Sand, 429 U.S. at 371 72; Martin, 41 U.S. at 389-95; Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 428, 658 P.2d 709, 714 (1983).
184 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 (1979).
'" The Commerce Clause and other alternative are discussed more infra Section III.C.
186 See Bryant Walker Smith, Water as a Public Good: The Status of Water Under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 291, 301 (2009) ("Today, water is
unambiguously a public good. A survey of current domestic water laws identified forty-four countries in
which significant water resources belong to the state, the nation, or the people; it identified no countries
that disavowed such public ownership.").
187 Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 167-68.
... Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct of Alpine Cty., 658 P2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983); Mont Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Currn, 682 P2d 163, 167 (Mont 1984) ('he theory underlying this doctrine can be traced from
Roman Law through Magna Carta to present day decisions."); State v. Cent Vt Ry., Inc., 571 A2d 1128, 1130 (Vt
1989) ("The public trist doctrine is an ancient one, having its roots in the Justinian Institutes of Roman law.");
Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) ('Tne principle that the public has an overriding interest in
navigable waterways and lands under them is at least as old as the Code of Justinian .... ."); Michael C. Blumm &
Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARiZ. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995)
('The trust doctrine's common law origins can, in fact, be traced back to medieval England and ultimately to Roman
law. Consequently, there are sound historical and conceptual reasons for grounding the public trust in common law."
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and consequently the shores of the sea" are "common to [all] mankind."
'189 One
scholar describes this commons approach as: :
Roman law did not distinguish among the many forms of fresh water in
nature: clouds, rain, diffused surface water, stream flow, river underflow,
percolating groundwater, vapor, lakes, flood water, seepage, etc. Because
of the fugitive and fluctuating character of water in its natural state,
Roman law denied the existence of property in water
altogether- including running water-and held the use of rivers and
lakes to be the common right of everyone, like the 
sea and the air.
19
The Code thus made clear that the public has a common right to "running water"
generally-separate from an interest in the sea.'
9 ' All have a right and interest to use
flowing water, whether that be "rivers" or "ports."'
192 Even prior to that, in ancient
China, there was a strong recognition of public interests in water.
193 At the public
trust's true source, therefore, there is no clear distinction about the public's interest
in certain types of water or uses of water-the public's interests is protected as to all
"flowing water."'
194
(footnote omitted)); Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the
Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DuKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 57,62-63 (2005); Cynthia L. Koehler,
Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541,
544-45 (1995); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631,633-34 (1986); Eric Nelson, The Public
Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes: Glass v. Goeckel, 11 ALB. L. ENVTh. OUTLOOK J. 131,136-38 (2006); George
P. Smith 1I & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations within a Penumbra,
33 B.C. ENVrL AFF. L. REv. 307, 310-13 (2006); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A
Conservative Reconstruction & Defense, 15 SF- ENVrL. LJ. 47, 56-57 (2006).
189 J, INST. 2.1.1-4; see also Deveney, supra note 60, at 23 (quoting J. INST. 2.1.1-5).
'9 David B. Anderson, Water Rights as Property in Tulare v. United States, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV.
461, 475 (2007); see also Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896) ("The first of mankind had in
common all those things which God had given to the human race. This community was not a positive
community of interest, like that which exists between several persons who have the ownership of a thing
in which each has his particular portion. It was a ... negative community, which resulted from the fact
that those things which were common to all belonged no more to one than to the others .... That which
fell to each one among them commenced to belong to him in private ownership, and this process is the
origin of the right of property. Some things, however, did not enter into this division, and remain therefore
to this day in the condition of the ancient and negative community. .... 'These things are those which the
jurisconsults called res communes .... the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its shores."'
(quoting R.J. Pothier's treatise on property)), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979);
Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638, 640 (1957).
'91 See J. INST. 2.1.1.
1
92 1d. at 2.1.1-2.
193 U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Asia and the Far East, Water Legislation in Asia and the Far East, Part 1,
U.N. Sales No. 67.II.F. 11, at 25-36 (1967) ("[P]rivate water ownership in China was never mentioned in
Chinese water laws until very recently, and [] everyone's compliance with their duties in the use,
distribution and control of water, and waterworks construction and maintenance would correspond to, and
enhance, the public welfare.").
194 Roman law did mention the importance of the public's ability to navigate on waterbodies, but there is no
suggestion that the use was meant as a limitation on the public's interests. See Kanner, supra note 188, at 63.
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There are many other pre-American hints that the true guiding principle of the
public trust is protection of a wide-ranging public interest in water.1 95 In the 1600s,
the Commonwealth of Oceana was published, a text that would prove pivotal in the
evolution of water-trust principles.19 6 This text emphasized that trust principles were
tethered to a fundamental public interest in the water resources held by the
government, not a particular type of body of water.'97 Spanish and French law
agree.'
98
English common law, although sometimes offering conflicting descriptions of
the public right to water, often emphasized that the public interest stemmed from
flowing water:
[FIlowing water is publicijuris, not in the sense that it is bonum vacans,
to which the first occupant may acquire an exclusive right, but that it is
public and common in this sense only, that all may reasonably use it who
have a right of access to it, that none can have any property in the water
itself, except in the particular portion which he may choose to abstract
from the stream and take into his possession, and that during the time of
possession only.' 99
At the end of the American Revolution, public trust principles were incorporated
in Article III of the 1783 Peace Treaty between Britain and the United States, when
the parties "agreed[] [t]hat the People of the United States shall continue to enjoy
unmolested the Right to take Fish" and "also on the Coasts, Bays and Creeks of all
other of His Britannick Majesty's Dominions in America.""°
In early America, courts consistently characterized the public trust as protecting
the public's interest in water at large-since the very earliest adoptions of the
doctrine.20 1 Take Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,20 2 the single most
influential public trust case in U.S. history.203 Illinois had attempted to transfer a big
chunk of the Lake Michigan shoreline to a private company for economic
development.2' The Supreme Court struck down the giveaway of water resources
based on the public trust doctrine, holding that a state cannot divest itself of these
195 See MARC BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY: AN ESSAY ON ITS BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 183
(Janet Sondheimer trans., 1966); MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL
AND LEGAL HISTORY 1550-1850 117-19 (1984); see also JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH
OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 171 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1992) ("As an estate in trust becomes a
man's own if he be not answerable for it, so, the power of a magistracy not accountable unto the people
from whom it was received becoming of private use, the commonwealth loses her liberty.").
196 Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFFALO L. REv. 1077, 1111-12
(2004); see generally HARRINGTON, supra note 195.
'
97 
See generally HARRINGTON, supra note 195.
198 See BLOCH, supra note 195, at 183; MEYER, supra note 195, at 117-19.
'99 Embrey v. Owen (1851) 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585; 6 Ex. 353, 369 (emphasis added).
200 The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, between His Britannick Majesty and the United
States of America, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. 111, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
201 See, e.g., I11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (referring to the right at issue as
"the interest of the public in [] waters").
202 See generally id.
203 Lazarus, supra note 188, at 640.
2
04See Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 433-34.
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water resources if there was "substantial impairment of the interest of the public in
the waters.
'205
The Supreme Court tethered every aspect of its analysis of the public trust on
concepts of the "public interest" in water.
2
1 Indeed, the majority decision uses some
permutation of the phrase "public interest" in water sixteen 
times.20 7
The Court, in other words, implies that the interest protected by the public trust
is the public's interest in "water" as a whole, not only commerce.
20 8 The Court
considered that the "public [has an] interest[] in the use of such waters.
20 9 The Court
framed the inquiry as one to "insure freedom in their use so far as consistent with the
public interest. 210 On and on, the Court tied all of its reasoning to the "[t]he interest
of the people"; whether actions would "substantially impair the public interest in the
lands and waters"; and "improvement of... the public 
interest. 21
Indeed, the Court's premise for expanding the definition of navigability (and thus
expanding the waters covered by the doctrine) was that the public trust should be
based on the current "condition" of the United States and its waterbodies.
212 The
Supreme Court thus hints that the public trust's definition turns on a flexible analysis
of the condition-or need-of the public interest.
Over a decade later, Justice Holmes made this fundamental notion of public
interest in water more explicit:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is
omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as
population grows.... The private right to appropriate is subject.., to the
initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish one of the great
foundations of public welfare and health.
213
Courts have historically stepped in to eradicate water rights to support the
"public interest." For example, in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,
the U.S. Supreme Court prevented the complete diversion of the Rio Grande River
in New Mexico because it would interfere with important 
public interests in water.
214
Another illustrative case is a Minnesota Supreme Court case from the late 1800s,
Lamprey v. Metcalf215 The court called out other judges for suggesting that the
201 Id. at 435, 463-A4 (emphasis added).
206 See id. at 433-63.
207 Id.
201 Id. at 452-453.
209 Id. at 436.
210 id.
211 Id. at 452-53.
2 12 
See id. at 436.
213 Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
214 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 696, 703 (1899); see also Cal.
Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158-59 (1935).
21153 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893).
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touchstone for all public trust duties is whether waterways can support
commerce: "we fail to see why [noncommercial waters] ought not to be held to be
public waters, or navigable waters.'216 Highlighting the basic public-interest
principle that animates public trust principles, the court reasoned: "we do not see
why boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as well as
boating for mere pecuniary profit. '217 Over the last hundred years, many courts have
echoed this sentiment, defining the scope of public trust by looking to various public
interest considerations.2 1 8
Likewise, the public trust has extended to non-commerce uses since its early
conceptions. The most obvious examples are hunting and fishing.219 Courts have not
generally required that plaintiffs prove that their use of water or wild game was for"commercial" purposes.2 2' As early as the late 1800s, courts were protecting
recreational uses like boating and bathing.22'
True, cases, including Illinois Central, have often discussed the public's interest
in navigating water or using water for commercial purposes and referred to state
title-but given the historical context, it makes much more sense that these were
simply the particular interests that members of the public were pressing at the time,
which we will turn to next.
222
B. That the public trust doctrine is based on protecting wholesale public interests
in all waters aligns with its history: it has evolved to meet changing
threats to water resources at large.
So we have this longtime recognition that the public-current and future-has a
fundamental interest and right to water. And we have a response: this trust principle
that requires governments to protect the public's interests and rights. One might
expect that the contours of the public trust would thus reflect the threat to the public's
2 16 
Id. at 1143.
217 Id.
218 See, e.g., People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Hillebrand
v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (S.D. 1937); Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 800 (S.D. 1915); see also
Mineral Cty. v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 808-09 (Nev. 2001) (Rose, J., concurring) ("If the current law
governing the water engineer does not clearly direct the engineer to continuously consider in the course
of his work the public's interest in Nevada's natural water resources, then the law is deficient. It is thenappropriate, if not our constitutional duty, to expressly reaffirm the engineer's continuing responsibility
as a public trustee to allocate and supervise water rights so that the appropriations do not 'substantially
impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.' . . . '[T]he public trust is more than an
affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of
the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering
that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust.' Our dwindling natural resources deserve no less." (footnotes omitted)); Lawrence
v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606, 611 (Nev. 2011) (quoting Justice Rose's concurrence approvingly).2 19 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,533-34(1896), overruledby Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
220 See, e.g., id. at 530.
221 E.g., Lamprey, 53 N.W. at 1143-44.
222 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); see also JAMES RASBAND ET
AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 384-85 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing that water is generally a
public resource that is uncapable of being owned in its natural state).
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interest in water at large-as the threat grows, so does the reach and force of the
state's trust obligations.
And it turns out, in broad strokes, that this relationship indeed explains the
evolution of the trust doctrine in the United States. Courts have been notoriously
confusing about the contours of the trust-both about what waters it covers and what
uses it protects.223 But there is an unmistakable progression in lockstep through the
evolution of the doctrine. As threats to water have increased in number and kind, the
public trust has usually expanded to keep pace.
In early America, particularly in the East before the Western Expansion-where
water resources were plentiful and the threats to them few-the public trust doctrine
served a relatively narrow role. After all, the public's rights and interests in water
faced very different threats than those faced today.
224 We had not yet realized the
nature of threats imposed by overdrawing our water resources, much less climate
change. The public's interest in water centered on travel and fishing: "waterways
being the principal transportation arteries of early days, and for fishing, an important
source of food.-
225
This meant that large, arterial waterways were what concerned people, and their
government:
In an era before widespread highways and railroads, the farms and
industries of the Midwest poured their goods downriver to markets around
the world. The boomtowns of the century-New Orleans, St. Louis,
Cincinnati, and many others-thrived and grew on this waterborne
commerce. Waterways were so valuable that the nation began building
them. The Erie Canal was one.
226
Large waterways of commerce were clogged with traffic.
227 This was a problem
that England had faced as well.
228 So, like England, the brunt of early America's use
of the public trust doctrine was related to major "navigable" waterways that were
"highways of commerce."'22
9 Our ports were where trade happened; major rivers
were America's transport hubs.
230 And so all of the early caselaw was concerned
with (1) major navigable waterways and (2) uses related to navigation and
commerce.
231
223 Cf RASBAND ET AL., supra note 222, at 384-85 (discussing the changes and confusion surrounding
the public trust doctrine in relation to wildlife).
224 This is reflective of the nation's interests during eighteenth and early nineteenth century America.
See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 446-47 (1827) (noting the importance of navigation's
role in commerce to early America).
225 Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 52 (N.J. 1972).
226 On The Water-Inland Waterways, 1820-1940: River Towns, River Networks, SMITHSONIAN
NAT'L MUSEUM OF HISTORY, http://americanhistory.si.edu/onthewater/exhibition/
4_4.html
[https://perma.cc/P4FQ-N7PZ].
227 See Wilkinson, supra note 26, at 437 (discussing the importance of navigation on major bodies of
water in early America).
221 See id at 430-31.
229 Id. at 430, 433, 447-48 n.95.
230 See id at 426, 434-35, 437.
231 See supra Part I.
Vol. 108
A NEW WATER LAW VISTA
Tellingly, the very early historic caselaw is relatively silent on any concerted
efforts to protect other non-commercial or non-navigable public interests in water.2 32
And that silence is telling. The interests motivating challenges usually concerned
individuals who wanted to commercially fish or commercially navigate water.233
Later, it was commercial mining, then agriculture. 4 This was true prior to
America's adoption of the doctrine as well.235
The best view of this evolution may thus be one of practicalities: the nature of
the threats to the public's interests in water were largely commercial and involved
large waterways, so the caselaw developed to pay particular attention to commercial
interests early in its evolution.236 Waterbodies were not so inundated with uses that
members of the public's aesthetic or other interests in water were seriously
threatened, or at least not to the extent that they are today.237 Commerce happened to
be the public's main interest in water that was in jeopardy in these historical periods,
so these interests were litigated regularly.238 A lack of standing to sue for other
interests may have also contributed. 9
None of this is to suggest that there is no caselaw or authority suggesting that a
touchstone of the public trust doctrine is commercial navigability or state title to
beds, surely there is. The point is that this story does not align with either the
fundamental theory of the public trust-which does not emerge from commerce, but
water itself-nor with how courts have treated the public trust in non-commercial
contexts over the last 100 years.
If you accept that the public trust stems from the public conferring wholesale
natural rights to water to their government, then as explained next, the constitutional
rationale of this doctrine starts to become clear.
C. The doctrine is about protecting public rights vis-a-vis the government,
thus, it is constitutional in force.
The public trust doctrine does not appear in the text of the U.S. Constitution.24 °
Nor does it expressly appear in most state constitutions.241 Many courts have called
the public trust a "common law" rule, and indeed, its application and evolution
232 Caselaw is rife with examples of commercial challenges related to public trust principles, but
largely silent otherwise. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420,445 (1837); WIEL,
supra note 179, at 11-12 (reviewing various commercial disputes over water).233 See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 1-2, 8 (N.J. 182 1) (addressing commercial oyster farming).234 See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317,318-20 (1985).
235 See Natelson, supra note 196, at 1087 (explaining how the founders viewed a fiduciary government).
236 In other words, I suggest the more sensible interpretation of the caselaw in the precise opposite of
scholars like Maureen E. Brady-who suggests that the public trust was only ever protecting federal or
other interests in commerce. See Brady, supra note 175, at 1419.
237 See supra Section II.A (discussing evolution of threats to water resources in America).
238 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
239 Standing to sue for public interests in resources has only developed in recent decades. See
Turnipseed et al., supra note 89, at 13, 51-53 (discussing the changes surrounding standing in the context
of the public trust doctrine).
21 See McGlothlin & Slater, supra note 24, at 60-61.
241 See, e.g., ARiZ. CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
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appear common-law-like.
242 The doctrine has evolved over time, case by case, and
some of the earliest decisions call it a common law rule.
243 As mentioned in prior
sections, early American courts often framed the public trust in terms of
property: when states owned beds underneath water that came with an attendant
obligation to care for the water above them.
2" And the true source of the public trust
has been a hot topic in water law scholarship and jurisprudence for quite some
time.
245
But on balance, given the prior section's conclusion that the public trust protects
public interests and rights in water--coupled with the weight of historic and legal
authority-the true source of the public trust doctrine is constitutional.
i. History suggests that the public trust doctrine reflects a basic constitutional or
sovereign limitation on government authority.
Under the purely common-law view, state legislatures can abrogate the public
trust, just as they can abrogate any common law rule.
246 And courts similarly can
interpret the public trust into nonexistence.
247 But as it turns out, the best evidence
points to the public trust doctrine's roots in fundamental notions of sovereignty and
constitutional principles.248 Some of that evidence is the role of trust principles and
what those principles reflect-namely, a limitation on sovereign authority.
249 Given
that we have seen how the trust doctrine derives from the public conferring general
rights to flowing water on the government, a constitutional source of the doctrine
seems a foregone conclusion.
250
"The Social Contract theory, which heavily influenced Thomas Jefferson and
other Founding Fathers, provides that people possess certain inalienable lights and
that governments were established by consent of the governed for the purpose of
securing those rights."251' Trust principles are fundamental to our system of a limited
government-and they reflect a basic restraint on sovereign authority that is
242 See, e.g., PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012); Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp.
2d 11, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that that the public trust doctrine can be displaced by the 
Clean
Air Act); see also McGlothlin & Slater, supra note 24, at 60; John Wood, Easier Said 
than
Done: Displacing Public Nuisance When States Sue for Climate Change Damages, 41 ENVTL. 
L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10316, 10321 (2011).
243 See McGlothlin & Slater, supra note 24, at 58-61.
244 See, e.g., 11. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,435 (1892).
245 See generally McGlothlin & Slater, supra note 24 (arguing against the use of the public trust
doctrine because of its irregular development).
246 See Brady, supra note 175, at 1433, 1440 (criticizing the contention that the public trust comes
from any constitutional principles); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 
89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1975).
247 See Brady, supra note 175, at 1433 (arguing that judges did not view the Constitution as a limit
on their authority in relation to navigability).
248 See Michael C. Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting
Justice Kennedy and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 411,419 (2015) (describing the doctrine
as inherent in sovereignty and part of a state's reserved powers).249 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVL GOVERNMENT. SECOND TREATISE 102,184 (Gateway 1955) (1690).
250 See supra Section III.A.
251 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016).
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constitutional at least in force.2 The public trust doctrine is analogous to the many
trust principles baked into our U.S. Constitution and sovereign structure.
The seminal Oceana text was published in the 1600s, a text that would prove
pivotal in the evolution of water-trust principles.2 13 This text emphasized that trust
principles reflect a limitation on government authority: "an estate in trust becomes a
man's own if he be not answerable for it, so, the power of a magistracy not
accountable unto the people from whom it was received becoming of private use, the
commonwealth loses her liberty. '254
In the late 1600s, Charles II granted a charter to the "Governor and Company of
the English colony of Connecticut, in New-England, in America."255 This
proclamation clarified that the grant was "upon trust, and for the use and benefit of
themselves, and their associates, freemen of the said colony, their heirs and
assigns" -in other words, the governor was to serve as trustees for current and future
members of the colonies.2 56
John Locke's foundational Second Treatise on Civil Government analyzed public
trust principles at length, emphasizing that the government's trust duties reflect a
limitation on government authority vis-a-vis the people:
[T]he legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, thereremains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the
legislative when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed
in them; for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, being
limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed,
the trust must necessarily be forfeited .... 257
Executive officers were also trustees: "The power of assembling and dismissing
the legislative, placed in the executive, gives not the executive a superiority over it,
but is [a] fiduciary trust placed in him, for the safety of the people .... 2 58
At bottom, Locke was convinced that government trust principles reflect the
basic sovereign relationship between ruler and ruled: the trust's point is to prevent
governments from self-dealing or squandering resources-and puts the power of
enforcement in the hands of the people.259 According to Locke, public officials
should not engage self-dealing:
[G]ovemment... being... entrusted with this condition, and for this
end, that men might have and secure their properties, the prince, or senate,
however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of property
252 See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 947 (Pa. 2013) (discussing state
constitution's limitation on government authority).
213 Natelson, supra note 198, at 1 111-12.
254 HARRINGTON, supra note 195, at 171.
255 Charter of the Colony of Conn. (1662). The earlier charters of Virginia and Massachusetts contain
no such trust language. See First Charter of Va. (1606); Second Charter of Va. (1609); Third Charter of
Va. (1612); First Charter of Mass. (1629).
256 Charter of the Colony of Conn. (1662).
257 LOCKE, supra note 249, at 124.
25 1d. at 129.
259 See id. at 116.
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between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to
take to themselves the whole or any part of the subject's property without
their own consent. For this would be in effect to leave them no property
at all.
26°
All this early focus on trust principles as fundamental imitations on governments
carried over to the states at the founding of America. Indeed, many states went so far
as to incorporate express trust principles in their constitutions.
2 61 For example, the
constitution of Maryland states as follows:
That all persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of
government are the trustees of the public, and, as such, accountable for
their conduct; wherefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted,
and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress
are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the old or
establish a new government
262
This concept of public trust principles acting as a fundamental limitation on
government authority is baked into the U.S. Constitution, as well.
263 The Constitution
limits the legislature's powers to collect taxes by the "general [w]elfare" of the
public.26 Although the Supreme Court has since interpreted this limitation broadly,
the phrase "general welfare" was meant to be a trust-related principle at the nation's
founding.265 Trust principles are part of other portions of the Constitution, too--like
the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Impeachment Clause.
266
History also suggests that protection of minority interests is essential to the
government's trust obligations. That is because fundamental to trust principles is the
duty of impartiality: a minority group's interests cannot give way to another's
interests just because it constitutes a bigger share--a trustee is trustee as to all
beneficiaries.
267
26 Id. at 116-17.
261 See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. IV; GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. XI, XV; MD. CONST. of 1776,
arts. XXXI, XXXII, XXXV, XXXIX, LII-LV; MASS. CONST. of 1780, Part the Second, eh. VI, arts. I, II,
IX; N.C. CONST. of 1776, arts. XII, XXXII; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art.
XXXIII; S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVI.
262 MD. CONST. of 1776, art- IV.
263 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. VII; id. art. I, § 9, cl. VIII; id. art. II, § 1, cl. II; id. art. VI, cl. 3.
264 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
265 See Natelson, supra note 196, at 1169 ("The Supreme Court... has ruled that the Clause grants
Congress open-ended authority to spend for what Congress deems the 'general welfare.' We have seen,
however, that at the time the Constitution was adopted, the phrase 'general welfare' was associated with
a trust-style restriction on government power."); see also Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare
Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (2003).
266 Natelson, supra note 196, at 1171-74.
267 See NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA: WITH 
ANSWERS TO THE
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED AGAINST THE SYSTEM 20 (1787); 
Letter from James
Madison to George Washington (Oct. 18, 1787) (on file with the Library of Virginia) (suggesting that
granting monopolies would be a breach of trust and outside of Congress's enumerated powers).
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Trust principles as applied to our government have always been categorized as
constitutional, so it follows that the public trust doctrine is, too.
The very nature of the public trust doctrine reveals that it has always operated
and been intended to operate as a reflection of sovereign authority over water. Illinois
Central made these limitations clear.268 The U.S. Supreme Court has never suggested
that legislatures can abdicate public trust duties-indeed, in Illinois Central, it said
the opposite.269 And given that the Court there never once mentioned Illinois law, it
could not have been operating on the presumption that Illinois was silent about
whether it wanted to be bound by the trust's limitations.
The public trust doctrine's similarity to constitutional police powers is also
telling. The Supreme Court made this connection itself in Illinois
Central: "[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, .. . than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration
of government and the preservation of the peace."27
The reserved powers doctrine confirms this view: the Supreme Court has
recognized that this doctrine prevents legislatures from abdicating sovereign
authority-and a line of authority applying this doctrine was cited in Illinois
Central.271 As explained later, the reserved powers doctrine also supports a Due
Process source for the public trust.272 Similar to the reserved powers doctrine, a long
line of cases (dating back to English common law) holds that legislatures cannot bind
future sitting legislatures, which suggests that no legislature can constitutionally
abdicate trust responsibilities.273
Courts have often expressly recognized the inherent sovereign limitations
imposed by the public trust doctrine.274 Justice Douglas in Palmer v. Thompson
261 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435,457-58 (1892).
269 d. at 453.
170 Id. at 453.
271 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996); Ilt. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453,
459 (discussing Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548 (1879) and noting "that there could be no contract and
no irrepealable law upon governmental subjects... that every succeeding legislature possesses the same
jurisdiction and power as its predecessor; that the latter have the same power of repeal and modification
which the former had of enactment ... and that a different result would be fraught with evil"); see also
Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. at 559 (recognizing the reserved powers doctrine and explaining that
"[e]very succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to them as its
predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification which the former had of
enactment, neither more nor less").
272 See infra Section lII.C.ii.
273 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Sup. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 721-22 (Cal. 1983). The case
discusses the concept that "trusts by which the property was held by the State can be resumed at anytime."
Id. (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 455-56). This concept, however, dates back much farther.274 
See, e.g., San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz.
1999) (explaining that the doctrine is a constitutional limitation on the legislature); In re Water Use Permit
Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000) (noting that the doctrine comes from inherent sovereign
authority); Lawrence v. Clark Cty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (noting that the "doctrine arises from
the inherent limitations on the state's sovereign power"); Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901,
948 (Pa. 2013) (saying that the public trust rights are preserved rather than created by the state
constitution); see also Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A
Sustainable Middle Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 311 (2010) ("Public trust principles have been
described as an essential attribute of sovereignty across cultures and across millennia." (footnotes
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advocated that the rights protected by the Ninth Amendment should include 
water.275
But one of the most thorough cases on this point is Robinson Township
v. Commonwealth.276 The Court explained that the public trust derives from "the
concept that certain rights are inherent to mankind, and thus are secured rather than
bestowed by the Constitution" and that this principle "has a long pedigree in
Pennsylvania that goes back at least to the founding of the Republic."
'2 77 International
law supports this constitutional or sovereign source as well.
2 78 Other courts and
commentators have long emphasized the fundamental sovereign notion of the public
trust doctrine.
279
The public trust doctrine, therefore, makes most sense as a trust limitation on
sovereign authority: a reflection of the government's limited rights to interfere with
the public's interest in water resources. Like other trust principles underpinning U.S.
sovereignty and the Constitution's writing, the public trust doctrine is fundamental.
Under this view, both the state and federal government would be bound by the public
trust. After all, both are limited by the public's rights.
28°
ii. The best theoretical (and practical) home for the doctrine sits
in the due process clause.
Acknowledging that the public trust doctrine stems from constitutional and
sovereign limitations on the government is an important first step. But we need some
more flesh on those bones. What are the character of those limitations?
Scholars who agree that there is a constitutional or fundamental sovereign hook
to the doctrine have proposed a few sources. Those include the Commerce Clause,
the Due Process Clause, the Ninth Amendment, and the Union Clause"
(among others).281' But given that the doctrine's core tenet is protecting the public's
broad interest in water rights, its intrinsic flexibility,
282 and the public trust's
similarity to police powers and its focus on the public's concrete rights to water
resources-the Due Process Clause makes particular sense.
omitted)); Gerald Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law's DNA, 4 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. &
POL'Y 281, 291-92 (2014).
275 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
276 See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 948-49.
277 Id. at 948 n.36 (quoting Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 208 (Pa. 2013)).
278 See generally Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust
Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling 
the Saxion Vision, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012).
279 See, e.g., United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 124 (D. Mass. 1981) (saying
neither the federal nor state governments can convey trust lands free of the sovereign's jus publicum);
supra note 277.
280 See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 248, at 411 (describing the doctrine as inherent in sovereignty
and part of the state's reserved powers).
28' Cf William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L.
REV. 693, 711 (2012) (discussing the importance of determining the legal source of the public 
trust
doctrine); Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 188, at 713-15.
282 "One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to
substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, 
more or less
flexible...." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965).
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The Due Process Clause incorporates unenumerated rights against the federal and
state governments.283 Whether a particular unenumerated right or limitation qualifies
depends on "whether the right... is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty
or... whether this right is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'' 284
When identifying fundamental rights that merit protection under substantive due
process, courts look to tradition and the nation's history.285
Importantly, the Supreme Court has had no trouble recognizing new fundamental
rights when evolving threats to our rights manifest themselves. As Justice Kennedy
explained in the Obergefell v. Hodges decision:
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights . . . did not
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so
they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals
discord between the Constitution's central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.2 86
As explained above, overwhelming authority recognizes a public interest and
right in water that predates America's founding.287 That this right is important is hard
to argue. 288 Many states themselves have declared public interests and rights in
water.289 These concrete, tangible expectations in public water interests predate
America's founding.
290
Since the earliest conceptions of the doctrine, courts have named these rights as
a public "ownership" or "title" in water.291 Although a true ownership theory in the
simple property sense has been debunked, this property language reinforces the
principle that the public has concrete, protectable interests in water resources.29 2
Perhaps most telling is that courts have widely agreed that the public trust doctrine
confers standing.293 The Supreme Court has not yet expressly recognized
fundamental rights to water resources, but it has been inching closer in its standing
cases.
294
In the past, there was little need to recognize that the Due Process Clause protects
the public's interests in natural water, but that does not mean the protections were
283 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (discussing the unenumerated right of privacy).
284 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (citation omitted).
285 See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967).
286 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
287 See supra Section III.A.
218 See generally Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 248.
289 Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 178-79 (comparing state proclamations on water ownership).
290 See Donna Jalbert Patalano, Police Power and the Public Trust: Prescriptive Zoning through the
Conflation of Two Ancient Doctrines, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 683, 705A06 (2001).
291 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457-58 (1892) (noting that the state holds
title to resources for the public).
292 See Hall & Regalia, supra note 47, at 184-86.
293 E.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (111. 1970); Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. State,
Dep't of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1096 (Alaska 2014).
294 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751-52 (1972).
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not there. As threats to water resources have reached a peak, "we learn
[the Constitution's] meaning" in this space.
295
The due process theory dovetails nicely with the Ninth Amendment, too. That
the public has unalienable rights that the government cannot infringe upon is a
backdrop to the Constitution, as well as the basis for the Ninth Amendment.
296 After
all: "[The Ninth Amendment] was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of
specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential
rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial
that others were protected.
'297 The public right to water fits the definition of an
"essential" right that did not-at the time of the founding perhaps-warrant
enumeration. But those rights are no less effective and no less protectable under Due
Process.
A Due Process or sovereignty principle makes particular sense given the limiting
nature of the public trust doctrine. After all, the doctrine is a "trust"--it has always
been a limitation on what sovereigns can do with resources.
298 If the sovereign could
shed its trustee duties on a whim, there would be little 
force to the doctrine.
299
The public trust's similarity to state's police powers (in conjunction with the
reserved powers doctrine) also supports the Due Process view. The Illinois Central
court explicitly compared the public trust doctrine to a state's police powers.
300 Both
doctrines also stem from the relationship between states and their citizens.
30 1 And
courts frequently consider challenges to police powers under the Due Process
Clause.
302
Process of elimination is also helpful. The main alternative constitutional home
for the public trust doctrine is the Commerce Clause. But for one, the Commerce
Clause butts up against the consistent mandate that state law defines the contours of
the public trust doctrine. For example, the Supreme Court explained in PPL
Montana, LLC v. Montana that "the contours of [the] public trust do not depend upon
the Constitution" because "[u]nder accepted principles of federalism, the States
retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over waters within
their borders.'3°3 This language suggests that the federal Commerce Clause is not the
real source of the doctrine. The Commerce Clause would also suggest that the public
trust doctrine concerns the relationship between the federal government and the
states-and it never has.
3
0
4
The Due Process Clause fits much better on this point. If the doctrine stems from
the government protecting public interests-and those public interests turn on the
295 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
296 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,488-89 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
297 Id.
298 See supra Section I1l.C.i.
299 See infra Part V.
'00 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453,459 (1892).
301 Compare Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 397 (1926) (describing the due
process relationship), with Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453.
302 E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,541-42 (2005); Viii. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87.
303 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 604 (2012).
304 See Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois Central Public Trust Doctrine and Federal Common Law: An
Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS W.-N.W.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 113, 134-35 (2010).
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nature of state waters themselves-then it would make sense that state law, not
federal law, governs the initial question (with federal public trust law, as I will
explain later, playing a role in addressing remedies).30 5
The recent case of Juliana v. United States signals a potential sea change in
courts' appetite for recognizing substantive due process claims based on the public's
collective interest in natural resources.306 Juliana has been called "the most
important lawsuit on the planet right now. '307
In Juliana, twenty-one young people, ranging in age from eight to nineteen,
alleged, among other things, that the federal government violated its public trust
duties by failing to stop climate change.3 8 The plaintiffs called for the government
to "phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric
[carbon dioxide]."309 Their theory was that the government has infringed their
fundamental rights by allowing climate change to run rampant.310
The court ultimately held that the plaintiffs had a fundamental right to a stable
climate.311 The court also held that the public trust doctrine applied, based on the
theory that the federal government had abdicated its duties over the tidal lands it
owns (not its or the states' duties over water).312 The court analyzed and rejected the
argument of whether the political question doctrine prevents courts from recognizing
these public trust rights.3 13 But as we will see, the political question doctrine is
entirely inapplicable given that the point of the public trust doctrine is to limit the
political branches' powers.314
The Juliana decision, and its reception, signals a growing acceptance of
challenges based on the public's interests in natural resources. The Court's reliance
on the Due Process Clause is in line with the constitutional underpinnings suggested
in this article.
But the strong opposition that has met the Juliana case tees up an important
problem of scope: if everyone has a generalized fundamental right to natural
resources, are there no limits on challenges to environmental challenges?31 5 Indeed,
courts are already inundated with challenges under federal statutes like the National
Environmental Policy Act.
316
305 But that would not prevent one from challenging a deprivation of Due Process under the U.S.
Constitution. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435.
306 See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016).M7 Press Release, Our Children's Trust, Judge Coffin to U.S. Government: 'Are You Robbing Peter
to Pay Paul?' (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/press-releases [https://perma.cc/389T-
RWXL] (quoting Bill McKibben and Naomi Klein) (scroll down and click on the release's hyperlink).30
8 Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1233-34.
309 Id. at 1239.
31 See id. at 1233.
311 Id. at 1250.312 Id. at 1256-61.
313 See infra Part IV.
314 See infra Part IV.
315 The Juliana court attempted to cabin its decision by narrowing its decision to climate change, which presents
an unusually dangerous threat to resources. See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250,1265-67.316 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172,
1213-14 (9th Cir. 2008).
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The Juliana court also went much farther than recognizing that the public trust
over water is rooted in the U.S. and state constitutions and fundamental notions of
state sovereignty-which allows both federal and state courts to determine the reach
of the doctrine, as this article proposes. Instead, Juliana recognized a basic
fundamental right to a stable climate under the Due Process Clause, predicated on a
generalized harm to the environment.
3 17 It also grounded these rights in federal
land-ownership, which would be of little help to members of the public seeking to
enforce the states' public trust duties to additional state waters where there is no land
ownership hook.
Before leaving this section, a couple counterpoints to a constitutional framework
should be aired. The public trust doctrine is unique in that it protects public interests,
not private ones. The doctrine's purpose is to craft a means for challenging the state's
abdicating of its authority. So, the existing substantive Due Process framework is not
implicated.
318
A final counterpoint is that the U.S. Supreme Court has, a couple of times now,
characterized the public trust doctrine as "a matter of state law."
'3 19 It could follow
that this implies that the U.S. Constitution can't be implicated at all. At the outset,
statements like this are, at best, dicta. The Supreme Court has never actually taken
up the question of whether the public trust doctrine is solely a matter of state law.
Nor could it: no accepted case has presented the question whether a state has
abdicated its sovereign duties by infringing on the public's general interest in water.
That is, except Illinois Central. And recall, in Illinois Central, the Supreme Court
enforced the public trust without a single cite to Illinois 
law. 320
But more importantly, there are several reasons that these dicta statements are
consistent with a constitutional view of the public trust doctrine. For one, as we have
seen, state law is central to the public trust doctrine, because it is the states who hold
most of the water potentially subject to the trust.
321 It is also state sovereignty duties
that are enforced under the public trust doctrine. And, so, we look to state law to
determine whether certain waters have been accepted into that trust and whether the
trust has been breached. But that does not mean that the federal courts cannot play a
role in determining when states have abdicated their sovereign duties by infringing
upon the public's right to water (which can, eventually, deprive the public of their
fundamental rights to water).
For another, state constitutions usually contain due process clauses, which form
an additional check on the states' abdication of their water-trust duties .322 Thus, even
if the public trust doctrine were a matter of "state law," that would not undermine
31 7 
Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1248-50.
311 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712, 721 (Cal. 1983)
(discussing the "public interest" protected by the doctrine).
319 E.g., PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 372 (1977).
320 See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
321 See supra Sections III.A-B.
322 See, e.g., Zachary Bray, Texas Groundwater and Tragically Stable "Cro
ssovers, " 2014 BYU L. REV. 1283,
1295, 1306-07 (discussing the addition of the "Conservation Amendment" to Texas's constitution).
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the theory that the doctrine reflects a limit on sovereign authority vis-a-vis the
citizenry.
With the doctrine fimnly rooted in constitutional principles, particularly the Due
Process Clause, the question is: so what?
IV. WHEN COURTS FIND THAT A STATE INFRINGES THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN
WATER, EXPANDING THE PUBLIC TRUST'S REACH IS THE REMEDY
-AND A JOB FOR THE JUDICIARY ALONE.
A. Interpreting when states exceed their authority and infringe on the public's
general right to water is a unique job for the judiciary
With the public trust doctrine firmly entrenched in constitutional and sovereign
principles, the judiciary's role becomes clear. The public trust doctrine simply
reflects the states' limited authority over water vis-a-vis the people. When states
allow too much water to be privatized or harmed, thus infringing on the public
interest, those states have exceeded their authority. And interpreting the bounds of
that authority is a classic judicial function--both state and federal.
Like the interpretation of any other constitutional doctrine, this is a job for the
courts alone.323 Although this means that legislative and executive decisions about
water can be overruled, that is proper. After all: "while democracy may seem
subverted when a court overrules the acts of elected officials, such judicial acts in
fact serve democracy by preserving rights invested in all the people."324 "Courts act
as 'an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority.' 3 25
"Because the duty to 'say what the law is' is vested entirely and exclusively in the
judicial branch, the Court has made plain that Congress may not interfere with the
federal courts' independent process of adjudication and interpretation.'32 6
First, interpreting the public trust doctrine is at the core of judicial function.327
Following prior sections above, courts are merely redressing the wrong of states
infringing on the public interest in water.3 28 The application of the public trust
doctrine has been the job of the judiciary since its inception.3 29 The judiciary's role
makes sense when you remember that the public trust is about protecting tangible
323 This is not a controversial point Alexander Hamilton famously said that "[tjhe interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts"-and tat has remained the case. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135
S. CL 1199, 1217 (2015) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)).
324 David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private
Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 715 (2008).31 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1219 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)).
326 Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
327 See id. at 1264 ("[T]he federal courts are charged with interpreting the Constitution and ensuring
that the statutory law is consistent with it-a determination that is, in the words of Chief Justice John
Marshall, the 'very essence of judicial duty."' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803))).
328 See supra Part III.
329 See supra Part I.
2019-2020
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
current and future rights in water. Some scholars have even analogized these future
rights to a future property interest being protected by courts.
330
Second, separation of powers principles dictate that the judiciary alone must be
the final arbiter of the reach of the public trust doctrine--and thus the limits of the
other branches' authority vis-a-vis the people. "[E]ver since Marbury," the Supreme
Court "has remained the ultimate expositor of the [C]onstitution[]."
'331
"Many decisions . . . have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v.
Madison that '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department o
say what the law is."'332 And the public trust doctrine requires us to consider the
appropriate role of the legislature in infringing on the substantive rights of the public
to water.
Separation of powers is fundamental to our system of government, known
"[e]ven before the birth of this country ... to be a defense against tyranny."
333 It is
"a basic principle of our constitutional scheme that one branch of the Government
may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another."
'334 We learn about the
value of checks and balances in law school (if not long before). As Arizona courts
have noted, the public trust doctrine is rooted in our system of checks and balances
and applies with equal force to sovereign authority 
over water.335
That's because, as explained above, the public trust doctrine at its heart is a
reflection of the limitations placed on states in harming the water resources that the
public entrusted to them. To give the state political branches the keys to the limits of
their own powers would undermine the limitation 
itself.336
Third, the reserved powers doctrine further supports the judiciary's role. Under
this theory, powers not expressly or impliedly given to the government are retained
by the people.337 In addition to this doctrine, it has been recognized that powers
conferred to the state "can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and [are]
inalienable by express grant."."
'338 When one accepts that the public's interest in
water as a whole was conferred in trust on the states, the reserved powers doctrine
requires that states not abdicate that right. And the judiciary is in the best position to
determine that question.
One follow-up question is: whose separation of powers, state or federal? The
answer is likely both. State constitutions typically provide for the same tripartite
structure as at the federal level.
339 And scholars have explained at length why state
separation of powers principles are just as supportive of a limited legislative and
0 See, e.g., Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public Trust
Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 83-85 (2011).
... United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000).
332 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (citation omitted).
333 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1996).
134 Id. at 757.
335 E.g., San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. CL ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz.
1999); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 168-69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).3 36 
SeeNORMAN SINGER& SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3:4(7th ed. 2018).
317 Walter F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 201-03 (1915).
338 See Atd. Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914).
339 E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 1; id. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1; id. art. V, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1; NEB.
CONST. art. V, § 1; id. art. III, § 1; id. art. IV, § 6.
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executive branch as the federal government are-regardless of whether particular
states have constitutionally instituted express separation of powers principles.34 ° And
when the public's fundamental rights to water are infringed, the U.S. and state
constitutions are implicated. So, challenges in either court should be proper.
One obvious counter is that public rights are typically protected through the
political process, not the judicial one.341 Public right cases are often dismissed on
political question grounds or as general grievances.342 But the political question
doctrine should be no barrier to the view that the reach of the public trust doctrine is
constitutional and the province of the courts. This doctrine instructs that certain
questions should be left to the political branches of government.343 The doctrine is a
narrow one.3" The core factors are (1) a commitment of the question to a non-judicial
branch of government; (2) a lack of judicially manageable standards for resolving an
issue; and (3) the impossibility of deciding the dispute without a policy choice clearly
appropriate for non-judicial discretion.34 5
At the outset, interpretation of the bounds of the public trust doctrine is an
interpretation of the political branches' powers-not traditionally a political
question.346 Interpreting whether and when states have violated their constitutional
or sovereign duties does not touch on the sorts of political questions this doctrine is
concerned about."7 Instead, interpreting whether the other branches have exceeded
their powers is at the heart of the judicial role.348 As demonstrated in the Juliana
decision: determining the remedy to redress harm is the judiciary's function.349 And
as the Ninth Circuit recently explained: claiming that review of legislative or
340 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 395-96; see also Dodd, supra note 337, at 203-04.311 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
342 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 (1968). The standard, however, has varied considerably
over time. Compare United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
688-90 (1973), with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 502 (1975) (discussing standard in different
terms).
343 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.").
3 See id at 217.
345 id.
34 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (noting that courts should adjudicate disputes in a "form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process").
147 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 927-28 (Pa. 2013).
141 Cf Lynn S. Schaffer, Pulled from Thin Air: The (Mis)Application of Statutory Displacement to a
Public Trust Claim in Alec L. v. Jackson, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 192 (2015) ("The limits placed
on the sovereign body represent the true power of the trust, especially when the government violates
fiduciary duties to protect trust property from impairment, damage, or waste.").
1
49 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1239 (D. Or. 2016). The court stated there that the"plaintiffs do not ask this Court to pinpoint the 'best' emissions level; they ask this Court to determine
what emissions level would be sufficient to redress their injuries. That question can be answered without
any consideration of competing interests." Id.
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executive actions is outside of its authority "runs contrary to the fundamental
structure of our constitutional democracy" and is "beyond question" a province 
in
the judiciary.35°
There is no real theory that the question of the reach of sovereign authority under
constitutional or sovereign principles would be one for the other branches.
351 There
are also judicially manageable standards for resolving these questions-the existing
and specific threats to public interests in local 
waters.352
Another common argument against the public trust doctrine as a judicially
enforceable, constitutional doctrine is that it displaces the common law.
35 3 But, as
explained above, that view simply misconstrues the doctrine as one of mere common
law, rather than a limitation on sovereign authority.
354 Not to mention that even if
the common law theory were accepted, rights granted at common law cannot be
abrogated without an adequate substitute,
3 55 and there isn't one here. At bottom, the
reason courts have considered public rights squarely aligns with the entire purpose
of the public trust doctrine: democratic failure.
356 And legislatures and executive
agencies are failing.
357
And it is not entirely clear that this is a generalized grievance issue in the first
place: public interests in water define the scope of the public trust doctrine-but 
not
the private interests that form standing to sue. The two seem like separate questions.
State authority over water comes from fundamental sovereignty principles-and 
all
water was charged with a trust at the nation's founding. Another important point is
that although the public trust grants rights to all members of the public to protect
public interests, it is also based on private rights to those interests.
358 The public
nature concerns how the public trust should be interpreted, not so much 
the
individual member of the public's rights to redress wrongs against them.
... Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017).
351 Id. at 1161.
352 See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1239 ("Plaintiffs could have brought a lawsuit predicated on
technical regulatory violations, but they chose a different path .... Every day, federal 
courts apply the
legal standards governing due process claims to new sets of facts.").
... See Schaffer, supra note 348, at 175.
314 See Albert C. Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas in a Pod?, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1095 (2012) ("[T]he public trust doctrine functions in a quasi-constitutional 
way: it
establishes overarching fiduciary principles regarding trust resources that may 
not be overridden by
legislative or executive action.").
... Bland v. Scott, 112 P.3d 941, 949-50 (Kan. 2005).
356 Professor Ely makes the general case for judicial review based upon democratic failure. JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4 (1980).
357 See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2010),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2010/10/11/as-the-world-burns [https://perma.cc/6GP8-TE
2Z]
(describing the failure of Congress to pass climate change legislation in 2010); Ryan Lizza, 
The President
and the Pipeline, NEW YORKER (Sept. 9, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/0
9/16/the-
president-and-the-pipeline [https://perma.cc/4HEU-AZTC]; supra Sections II.A and 
l.B.
358 Indeed, the Illinois Central decision was about protecting individual rights in use of the Chicago
waterfront. 111. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 421-22 (1892).
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B. The court's role in the public trust doctrine is best viewed as one of deciding
remedies: because courts are requiring states to take trust duties over
the waters needed to redress a public wrong.
But saying that the judiciary can defeat legislative decisions with the public trust
is not enough. Because the more important question is: which aspects of the public
trust doctrine should the judiciary be interpreting and imposing on the other
branches?
We've seen that there are wide gaps in water resource management laws and,
despite some states' best efforts, the public trust doctrine.359 Many of these gaps, at
least when it comes to the public trust, are because of a misapprehension about where
the trust comes from-and, more importantly, where its limitations come from. Even
the state that clearly sits at the progressive end of the public trust spectrum,
California, still reasons that the reach of the public trust turns on historic concepts of
navigability, and that always, the ultimate definition of the public trust can be defined
by the other branches.36 °
In the historic Mono Lake decision, the California Supreme Court explained
en banc that the reach of the waters infused with public trust obligations turns on
historic concepts of navigation.36 ' More importantly, the court suggested that beyond
the traditional minimum, legislatures had the power to define the reach of the
doctrine, noting that the California legislature had "implicitly acknowledged"
expansions to the trust.362 The problem remains more fundamental.
Some scholars and courts have already suggested that legislatures cannot
abdicate their public trust duties over a certain subset of waters,3 63 but as we have
seen that is of only limited use because states can simply narrow the scope of the
doctrine with impunity.3" Instead, we should consider the view that the reach of the
public trust itself-in terms of which waters, which uses, and how effective-is a
constitutional question, too. This view makes sense because the public trust doctrine
is a means of determining when states have abdicated their constitutional duties by
failing to protect public water interests as a whole. To remedy those harms, states
will often need to take additional waters and uses into trust.
The judiciary's most important job should be interpreting what scope of public
trust obligations will satisfy the state's duties to protect the public interest in flowing
359 See supra Part II.
360 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).361 Id True, California has reasoned that the doctrine can reach non-navigable waters that affect
navigable ones-but the touchstone remains historic navigation. See id at 712, 720-21. The only reason
this was not an issue in the Mono Lake decision is that the lake was clearly navigable. Id. at 719.362 Id. at 713.
363 E.g., Takacs, supra note 324, at 714-15 (citing the Illinois Central Railroad court) ("While other
common law doctrines may be undone by explicit legislation, the Public Trust Doctrine seems sacrosanct,
holding a power beyond modification or revocation by legislative action."); see also James L. Huffman,
A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527,
565-68 (1989) (discussing how the public trust doctrine results in nondemocratic courts setting aside
decisions of democratic legislatures).
364 See Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 42, at 80-81.
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water as a whole. This follows if you accept the conclusions I've touched on in prior
sections:
* First, we accept that the public trust protects the public's basic
interest in water at large.
365
* Second, we accept that the public trust derives from the public
entrusting the entire corpus of natural waters to their governments.
3"
* Third, we accept that the public trust doctrine concerns when states
have violated their duties over these waters by allowing the public's interest
to be harmed-and is thus constitutional in 
nature.367
* The conclusion is that the judiciary's main role here is determining
which waters and which interests the states need to take trust obligations
over to remedy the harm wrought on the public's interest in flowing water.
In other words: the reach of the public trust doctrine-in terms of which waters
are covered, what uses are protected, and how much force the doctrine must play in
allocation decisions-all turns on the nature of the threat or harm to the public's
interest in water, and what will remedy those threats and harms.
A helpful framing theory is the law of constructive and resulting trusts. The
Restatement of Trusts discusses constructive trusts,
368 which are remedies for when
property is acquired and retaining that property would be unjust.
3 69 A resulting trust
similarly involves a trust that arises because the original owner of property did not
intend for the recipient to have all legal rights to 
it.37°
In the public trust context, we effectively have states sitting on water and failing
to prevent them from being harmed. Courts are stepping in and imposing a
constructive trust on the state's water resources to redress this wrong or recognizing
a resulting trust inherent in the public's original conferring of its interests to the
states.37' Determining the bounds of what water assets need to be put into the trust is
a classic judicial function.
On the other hand, separation of powers principles and the nature of the trust
doctrine suggest that courts should not be wading into questions about what
particular steps the other branches should be taking 
to preserve water resources.
372
Instead, courts should be doing three things: (1) deciding which waters and which
uses should be folded into the trust, (2) deciding whether threats to water are so dire
that public interest principles will override competing 
interests in water,
3 73
and (3) deciding when the other branches have abdicated their trust duties entirely.
365 See supra Section III.A.
366 See supra Sections III.A-III.B.
367 See supra Section III.C.
368 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959).
369 Id. §I cmts. d-e.
370 Id.
371 See Huffman, supra note 363, at 569 (discussing resulting trust theories).
32 A ftll discussion of this point is outside of the scope of this article, and likely ripe for another article entirely.
313 Recall that states give differing weights to the public trust factor when making allocation decisions.
See supra Section li.B. But allowing legislatures or agencies to effectively ignore public 
trust obligations
would amount to an abdication of the trust duty-and thus remains a question for the judiciary. 
See supra
Section lIl.C.i.
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Each of these determinations require courts to interpret the nature of the other
branches' obligations to protect public interests in water-and are thus well suited
for the courts.
V. THE JUDICIAL FRAMEwORK FOR THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
How might this all look in practice? Most importantly, this framework will plug
up the public trust holes that several states have created. This includes the legislative,
executive, and judicial holes. Because the courts are interpreting the boundaries of
sovereign authority,3 74 courts can no longer relegate the public trust to merely a
common law rule that can be overruled on a whim. Even better, the court's role
would now include interpreting the reach of the doctrine.
This version of the public trust doctrine is also simply more robust than others.
With the view that states have obligations to protect trust duties as to all flowing
waters-only at the point that public trust interests are seriously threatened-states
are not merely required to "consider" the public trust, instead, they are required to
preserve it.
375
Another key advantage is that if we recognize that the public interest and rights
in the entire corpus of flowing water predated our nation's founding-and that those
interests and rights were conferred in trust to the states-then challenges to state
water decisions under the Takings Clause will have less force.3 76
Other scholars and states have done admirable jobs at proposing how legislative
and executive branches should practically carry out their trust duties.3 7 7 Some
important fundamentals include requiring that every allocation of water touching on
judicially determined trust waters must include a public interest consideration.
Presumably, if courts determine that expanding public trust waters and uses is
warranted, then the public interest factor should be given extra, if not dispositive
weight in water management decisions. In other words, states act within their
constitutional authority only if they determine that the public interest is not impacted
by a particular water allocation.
Determining what waters need to be brought into the trust as a remedy for harms
to the public interest should be no problem for courts. Nor should determining when
states have failed to consider the right factors and thus abdicated their trust duties to
371 See supra Section III.C.ii.
375 The problem is that the entire point of a trust is that the trustee cannot extinguish it. See Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). And allowing states to merely "consider" the trust
undermines its constitutional and sovereign notion of limiting state authority to infringe on the public
interest. See supra Section III.C.i. But see John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background
Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 951-55 (2012) (accurately
explaining the history of courts often recognizing that states need only consider the public trust interest).
... See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 330, at 83-85 (discussing how the public trust doctrine interacts
with takings law).
371 See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, LegalAdaptive Capacity: How Program
Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 711,
729-31 (2016).
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consider the public interest.378 Courts conduct a similar analysis all the time under
various environmental statutes.379
This judicial-based approach will also free up courts in even the most progressive
states to further embrace the flexible public trust approach to water management.
That may be of some value. As mentioned above, the water crisis is quick-moving
and dire. A flexible public trust doctrine offers the adaptiveness tates need to protect
their diminishing water resources. The legislative approach to water law has a lot of
shortcomings that an even more robust judicial approach can fill.
38 ° As a few other
scholars have explained at length, the public trust doctrine's common law character
makes it a much better answer to many water problems today.
3 8
I After all:
The Anglo-American common law system, for example, is in some ways
more procedurally adaptive than the legislative process. A common law
court has the capacity to distinguish previous cases when addressing new
factual circumstances. If Congress wants to amend a statute to address a
new situation not covered by existing law, or because changed
circumstances have undercut the effectiveness of existing law, it must
follow the constitutionally prescribed method for changing the
law-adoption of the same bill by both houses of Congress and either
presidential signature or legislative override of a presidential veto by a
two-thirds vote.
38 2
As Robin Craig explains at length, the shortcomings of many legislative answers
to water law problems align quite nicely with a common law approach.
3 83 This
includes:
* The localized nature of water management needs;
384
* The threats to water are ever-changing;
385
* Experimentation is needed to find the best approaches to water
management;
386
* A flexible common-law approach will allow the doctrine to evolve.
387
7 For states like Washington and Montana that have statutes requiring some form of environmental
impact assessment, it should be easy to add a public interest review. See States and Local Jurisdictions
with NEPA-like Environmental Planning Requirements, NAT'L ENVTL. POLICy ACT,
https://ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/states.html [https://perma.cc/658A-XWGC].
"' See Citizens for Smart Growth v. Sec'y of Dep't Transp., 669 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11 th Cir. 2012);
Suffolk Cty. v. Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (2d Cir. 1977); see also National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(h) (2018).
380 See Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 377, at 729-30; J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for
Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems-With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation,
89 N.C. L. REv. 1373, 1381-82 (2011).
31l See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 163, at 676-78; Craig, supra note 88, at 412-13.
382 Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 377, at 729; see also Ruhl, supra note 380, at 1381 (making
the same argument).
311 See Craig, supra note 105, at 80607.
384 See id. at 807.
311 Id. at 795 96.
386 See id. at 846-50.
387 id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
We should consider a framework that fully empowers the federal and state
judiciary to determine the scope of the public trust in all of our nation's waters. This
framework acknowledges the basic relationship between threats to water and the
contours of the public trust. When courts determine that the public's interest requires
an extension of trust obligations to a new set of waterways or uses-then it can say
so. The court is declaring the bounds of the state's authority over water. With those
boundaries set, the other branches decide what to do on the ground.
The implications for this framework are many. State courts can now extend the
reach and force of the public trust doctrine, even in the face of the political branches
refusing to act. As important, federal courts can enforce the public's right to water
to ensure that states protecting the public's basic rights to water. The public, in other
words, can hold its government accountable to the social contract it signed when the
nation was founded-a contract to protect the public's natural resources today and
for future generations.
